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Legislating Safety Nets: Comparing Recent
Social Protection Laws in Asia
SURABHI CHOPRA*
ABSTRACT

In recent years, several Asian countries have begun moving away
from patchwork welfare programs toward providing more comprehensive
social protection. This is a significant shift in a region where social
welfare has not been politically popular,and the family has traditionally
absorbed the burden of supporting the young, the old, and the ailing.
Two of these states-India and Indonesia-have put new social
protection initiatives into law rather than simply formulating executive
policy. In this article, I examine recent social protection laws in both
countries. I look in particularat India's National Food Security Law,
passed in 2013, and Indonesia's laws on the National Social Security
System, passed in 2004 and 2011. These laws deserve attention because
they aim not just to extend benefits, but also to advance economic and
social rights, which are recognized in both India and Indonesia at the
constitutional level. Thus, these recent social protection laws potentially
deepen what Brinks and Gauri describe as the "legalization"of welfare
policy, whereby legal rights assume importance in policy, and legal
professionals, judges in particular,become significant in implementing
them. As such, these laws are likely to, and arguably should, impose
quite hard-edged obligations on the government and enable individuals
to hold the government to its obligations.At the same time, recent social
protection laws have the potential to allay concerns that legal
enforcement of economic social rights distorts policy and dilutes the
separationof powers. Through my analysis, I show that socialprotection
laws in both India and Indonesia have primarily expanded the policies
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an early draft of this article at the Annual Symposium of the Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies on "Law and the Globalization of Austerity" (Indiana University Maurer
School of Law, September 10-12, 2014), and am grateful for the feedback I received from
my co-participants at the symposium. I am also grateful to the Chinese University of Hong
Kong for supporting my research through a Direct Research Grant.
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that preceded them, rather than fundamentally restructured how
particularforms of social protection are delivered. Further, none of these
laws define the socioeconomic rights underlying them in a detailed,
substantive manner, creating rights that are minimal and definite, or
broad but weak. I go on to argue that despite gaps, flaws, and missed
opportunities, these laws-with the sum of rights, remedies, and
accountability mechanisms they contain-have made the rights to food
and social security more stable, and are likely to make them more
accessible to individuals.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, several Asian countries have begun moving away
from
patchwork
welfare
programs
toward
providing
more
comprehensive social protection.1 This shift is significant in a region
where social welfare has not been politically popular, and where the
family has traditionally absorbed the burden of supporting the young,
the old, and the ailing. 2 While many European governments have
whittled down welfare measures after the global financial crisis in the
late 2000s, Asian governments are, it appears, expanding social
protection and trying to tackle deprivation with fresh seriousness.
Two of these states-India and Indonesia-have put new social
protection initiatives into law, rather than simply formulating executive
policy. In this article, I examine recent social protection laws in both
countries. I look in particular at India's National Food Security Law,
passed in 2013, and Indonesia's laws on the National Social Security
System, passed in 2004 and 2011. These laws are significant not simply
because they facilitate the implementation of complex social policies. Of
course, the policies contained in recent legislation involve difficult, often
controversial, choices about how social protection should be designed,
whom to cover, and how to reach beneficiaries-all of which are worthy
of scrutiny. Those laws also deserve attention because they aim not just
to extend benefits, but also to advance economic and social rights, which
are recognized in India and Indonesia at the constitutional level.
In both constitutional orders, citizens are entitled to certain basic
goods and services as a matter of right, and the state is,
correspondingly, obligated to protect economic and social rights. Those
justiciable social and economic rights have been the bases for judicial
review of government policies and practice. Such judicial review divides
1. See Asian Welfare States: New Cradles to Graves, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2012,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21562210#sthash.'DXWOJUxf.dpbs.
2. See Ian Holliday, Productivist Welfare Capitalism:Social Policy in East Asia, 48
POL. STUD. 706, 709, 714-15 (2000).
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scholarly opinion, as does the justiciability of socioeconomic rights and,
even more fundamentally, those rights' very existence. Staunch critics of
social and economic rights claim that essential goods and services are
not rights at all. More moderate skeptics argue that while socioeconomic
rights might be conceptually defensible, these rights should not be
justiciable, given the hazards of judicial review, including its potentially
significant budgetary implications. Those objections could be dismissed
as irrelevant, given that an increasing number of states recognize social
and economic rights in their constitutions. 3 However, the trajectory of
judicial attempts to enforce those rights indicates that the skeptics'
apprehensions have not been easy to address.
Recent social protection laws in India and Indonesia mark a new
stage in the debate on whether and how social and economic rights can
be implemented. This legislation potentially deepens what Brinks and
Gauri describe as the "legalization" of welfare policy, whereby legal
rights, as well as other legal concepts, assume importance in designing
policy, and legal professionals-judges in particular-become significant
in implementing it. 4 As such, these laws are likely to, and arguably
should, impose quite hard-edged obligations on the government and
enable individuals to hold the government to its obligations. At the
same time, recent social protection laws have the potential to allay
concerns that legal enforcement of economic social rights distorts policy
and dilutes the separation of powers.
With those concerns in mind, I analyze the recent Indian law on
food security and Indonesian laws on social security. There is
considerable research on judicial review of social and economic rights,
and there is a vast body of work by economists and policy experts on
food, social security, and poverty reduction policies. However, there is
relatively little academic reflection on legislating,rather than litigating,
social and economic rights. Comparative legal research on Asia is
similarly quite limited. 5 The laws I look at here contain measures that

3. See Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights
in National Constitutions,62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043, 1050-51 (2014).
4. See VARUN GAURI & DANIEL M. BRINKS, Introduction: The Elements of Legalization

and the TriangularShape of Social and Economic Rights, in

COURTING SOCIAL

JUSTICE:

JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1,

3 (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2010); VARUN GAURI & DANIEL M. BRINKS, A
New Policy Landscape: Legalizing Social and Economic Rights in the Developing
World in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD at 303, 304, 334 (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks
eds., 2010).

5. For a recent example of comparative legal research focusing on Asia, see generally
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ASIA (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014)
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potentially affect the health and well-being of millions of people, and
appraising those important endeavors specifically from a legal
perspective might be instructive. In the rest of this article, I evaluate
how these laws formulate the citizens' entitlements and the state's
corresponding obligations, what remedies they provide, and what
measures they include to foster accountability. I consider how they
grapple with the underlying rights to food and social security
respectively, while accommodating the challenges-financial, practical,
and political-of implementing policies in large, diverse countries with
high levels of inequality.
In Section I of this article, I point out that social and economic
rights have received constitutional recognition and have been
considered amenable to individual enforcement only quite recently. I
discuss the debate around judicial review of these rights and argue that
legislation protecting social and economic rights would make these
rights more stable and accessible to individuals, while addressing the
concerns raised by judicial review. In Section II, I discuss the political,
legal, and economic differences that complicate comparing an Indian
law to an Indonesian law, but I argue that there are sufficient
socioeconomic similarities to make comparative analysis of social
protection laws in these large, rapidly developing Asian countries viable
as well as important. In Section III, I analyze India's recent National
Food Security Act, situating the law in its constitutional and policy
context. In Section IV, I similarly analyze Indonesia's social security
laws. In Section V, I reflect on both states' laws. I point out that social
protection laws in India and Indonesia are primarily expanding the
policies that preceded them, rather than fundamentally restructuring
how particular forms of social protection are delivered. Further, none of
these laws define the socioeconomic rights underlying them in a
detailed, substantive manner-creating rights that are either narrow
and strong, or broad but weak. I go on to argue that despite gaps, flaws,
and missed opportunities, these laws-with the sum of rights, remedies,
and accountability mechanisms they contain-have made the rights to
food and social security more stable, and are likely to make food and
social security more accessible to individuals.

(examining constitutional issues across Asian jurisdictions including freedom of religion,
constitutional courts, and property rights).
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I. ENFORCING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
A. GainingEqual Recognition
All three laws examined in this article engage social and economic
rights-in particular, the rights to food, healthcare, and social security.
Such rights are sometimes described as "second generation" rights, and
treated as distinct from so-called "first generation" civil and political
rights, such as the rights to privacy or a fair trial. The (non-binding)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 6 does not divide rights into two
categories. However, international treaties that followed in the wake of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights divide the list of rights in
the Declaration, with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 7 (ICCPR) recognizing rights related to political participation and
personal autonomy, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights8 (ICESCR) recognizing rights to essential goods
and services. This bifurcation resulted in part from normative
disagreement and in part from Cold War politics. 9 Some Western
governments followed the example of the United States at the time and
did not recognize economic and social rights. 10 At the time the
Covenants were drafted, and through the next two decades, economic
and social rights were viewed as imposing unfeasible burdens on the
state, and were contrasted with civil and political rights, which were
viewed as requiring only restraint by the state, rather than outlay. 1
6. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948).
7. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) (stating that people have political and civil rights, as well as cultural and social
rights).
8. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
9. See PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 278-81, 292
(2013). United Nations human rights conventions applicable to particular groups do not
divide rights into two families or generations. See Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46,
U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (Sept. 3, 1981); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res.
44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at 167 (Sept. 2, 1990).
10. The United States signed the ICESCR in 1977, but has yet to ratify it. See
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A16316 (Jan. 3, 1976). For updated ratification
information see the online updated version of Chapter IV Human Rights: ICESCR, U.N.
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang-en&
mtdsgno=iv-3&src=treaty (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
11. See ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 9, at 277.
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Many human rights lawyers have criticized this position, pointing out
that international law imposes multilayered duties on states in relation
to any human right. United Nations expert bodies on both the ICCPR
and the ICESCR have repeatedly clarified that states are obligated to
respect rights-that is, to refrain from violating human rights-and to
protect rights-that is, to prevent violations by third parties.1 2 Thus,
states have "negative" obligations that require restraint, as well as
"positive" obligations that require financial and practical effort whether
dealing with rights to education or shelter, or dealing with rights such
as freedom of speech that are found in some of the oldest liberaldemocratic national constitutions.
The current position in international human rights law is that both
13
sets of rights are "interrelated, interdependent and indivisible."' Civil
and political rights play an important role in securing basic goods and
services. Individuals who are able to criticize political leaders, examine
their performance, protest, and form associations to lobby the state are
better able to draw attention to their own material needs than their
counterparts who lack those freedoms. Sen and Dr~ze argue that rulers
who are judged daily by the media and periodically at the ballot box
move quickly to ameliorate extreme deprivation. They highlight the fact
that no democratic government has allowed a drought to escalate into a
famine. 14 In contrast, Sen and Dr6ze point to famines in colonial India
and the famine resulting from Chairman Mao's Great Leap Forward
policy in China as preventable disasters caused by the neglect of
undemocratic, unaccountable governments. 15
Just as civil and political rights strengthen access to basic
necessities, economic and social rights facilitate political participation
and personal autonomy. A person who does not have secure access to
food, healthcare, or housing faces a heightened risk of violence and
arbitrary treatment from state actors.16 Poverty weakens the
wherewithal to participate in public life and pursue private goals and
enjoyment-the slum dweller forced to pay protection money will very
likely lack the resources to complain to the police and demand redress,
12. See id. at 292; Aryeh Neir, Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, in ALSTON &
GOODMAN, supranote 9, at 297-99.
13. See What are human rights?, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFIcE, http:H/www.
ohchr.org/EN/Issues/PageslWhatareHumanRights.aspx, (last updated 2015); See also,
Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate
Food on its 20th Sess., 1999, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999); See Christine Chinkin, The
United Nations Decade for the Elimination of Poverty: What Role for InternationalLaw?,
54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 553, 576-80 (2001) (discussing different levels of obligation).
14. See JEAN DRkZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PuBLic AcTION 263 (1989).
15. See id. at 8, 212-13.
16. See Chinkin, supra note 13, at 554-56, 560-61.
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and a woman who must devote several hours a day to collect water will
have little time to attend the meetings of the village council. Chinkin
characterizes poverty as "in itself a denial of fundamental human rights
17
and a barrier to the enjoyment of all other human rights."
This understanding, which accords equal priority to economic and
social rights, seems morally intuitive, particularly once we acknowledge
that civil and political rights impose burdens on the state-as training
the police, organizing free and fair elections, and regulating hate speech
clearly do. Accepting that individuals have the rights to freedom of
expression or a fair trial by virtue of being human, or to be residents
within particular national boundaries, it is difficult to deny that
individuals also have rights to the food, water, and shelter that are
essential for survival and to the healthcare and education that are
necessary for a safe, autonomous existence.1 8 To argue otherwise
betrays a thin conception of dignity and a naive conception of politics.
The intertwined, mutually reinforcing nature of different rights is
recognized by U.N. human rights bodies, human rights NGOs, and large
sections of the international development community. This shift is
reflected at the national level, too. The constitutions of 158 states
recognize one or more economic and social rights as fundamental
rights. 19 However, constitutional recognition has been gradual-postcolonial constitutions drafted during the wave of decolonization after
the Second World War tended not to recognize those rights. For
example, the Indian Constitution recognized only civil and political
rights when it came into force in 1950, but it included non-binding
"Directive Principles of State Policy" that urge the executive branch to
prioritize socioeconomic welfare. 20 More recent constitutions, drafted
during democratic transitions in several countries in the 1990s and
2000s, have tended to include economic and social rights on the same
footing as civil and political rights. 2' Equal constitutional recognition

17. See id. at 556.
18. See Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, in ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 9, at
305-06; See also James W. Nickel, Poverty and Rights, 55 PHIL. Q. 385, 393 (2005).
19. See Jung, Hirschl & Rosevear, supranote 3, at 6.
20. INDIA CONST. arts. 36-51 (outlining many of the social and economic rights
guaranteed to the Indian people by their constitution). The post-colonial constitutions of
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan also include aspirational Directive Principles of
State Policy. See lain Byrne & Sara Hossain, South Asia: Economic and Social Rights
Case Law of Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, in SOCIAL RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 125, 125-

26 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008).
21. See ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 9, at 338-39, 353-55. Constitutional
recognition of social and economic rights in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the
1990s elicited skepticism at the time. See MARK V. TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG
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renders these rights, at least in principle, justiciable and enforceable on
similar terms to their civil and political counterparts.
B. Enforcing Social and Economic Rights
1. Social and Economic Rights in the Courtroom
Constitutional recognition of social and economic rights yielded
attempts to enforce these rights in court in many states. In several
developing countries, including, inter alia, India, South Africa,
Bangladesh, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia, individuals have challenged
government acts as well as policies on the ground that the state is
transgressing their socioeconomic rights. The resulting judicial review
has caused consternation. 22 Skeptics have cautioned that judges lack
the necessary knowledge and technical expertise to review matters of
public policy and do not have executives' bird's-eye appreciation of how
a particular decision or program fits within the larger policy landscape.
Therefore, judicial review of socioeconomic policy could result in
decisions that burden the public exchequer, distort policy priorities,
exceed what the state can deliver, damage macroeconomic outcomes,
and diminish microeconomic efficiency.
In response to these criticisms, it has been argued that adjudicating
a challenge to socioeconomic policy does not mean ousting the policy
makers. 23 On the contrary, defenders of judicial review argue, judges
are well placed to hear such challenges. In constitutional democracies
that allow judicial review, judges are experienced at elucidating
constitutional standards and evaluating arguments and evidence
against those standards. Moreover, judges are political actors-sensitive
to public opinion and concerned about credibility-and are therefore
unlikely to ignore budgetary constraints or to dictate the details of
24
socioeconomic policy.
Courts in many states have conducted judicial review based on
socioeconomic rights, so it might seem as if skepticism about such
review were ill founded. The landmark cases from different jurisdictions

RIGHTS:
JUDIcIAL
REVIEW AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 233-37 (2008).

SOCIAL

WELFARE

RIGHTS

IN

COMPARATIVE

22. For a review of this debate, see Marius Pieterse, Coming to Terms with Judicial

Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 383, 391-392 (2004).
23. See, e.g., id. at 391-399. For a personal perspective by a Justice of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa on adjudicating claims based on social and economic
rights, see Albie Sachs, Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights, 22 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV., 673, 697-700.
24. See GAURI & BRINKS, supranote 4, at 3-4, 343-44.
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certainly show that courts have been more agile when adjudicating
socioeconomic rights than their critics thought possible. However, this
comparative jurisprudence also indicates that courts have been
constrained by expertise and capacity, and, notwithstanding some
ostentatious rhetoric, have tended to be quite timid when enforcing
socioeconomic rights.
Many cases involve government failure to implement a policy, and
courts have pushed governments to follow through on their preexisting
plans and intentions. In cases that reveal a policy vacuum, courts have
directed governments, in relatively general terms, to move to a
particular end-as in the Grootbroom case where the South African
Constitutional Court required the government to implement a housing
25
policy for poor slum residents whose homes were being razed.
However, in other cases, courts have ordered a far more specific
outcome, such as expanding a program providing school lunches to
primary schools throughout India 26 and supplying anti-retroviral drugs
to HIV-positive pregnant women in health centers throughout South
Africa rather than only in a few select facilities. 27 It is worth noting,
though, that cases in this latter category are rare. Even in decisions
such as Treatment Action Campaign on access to anti-retroviral drugs
in South Africa or People's Union of Civil Liberties on provision of school
lunches in India, courts have expanded existing government programs
rather than created new ones. Moreover, courts have tended to ask,
expressly or impliedly, whether it is reasonable to withhold particular
goods or services from vulnerable individuals or groups, rather than
applying a more exacting standard or elucidating what the
28
socioeconomic right at issue requires the state to deliver.
Thus, courts have pushed governments to improve particular
instances of inertia or neglect, but judicial intervention has neither
yielded generally applicable standards nor clarified the state's
obligations. International law is more forthcoming on standards and
legal obligations in relation to economic and social rights. The ICESCR
acknowledges the vast variation in wealth, poverty, and state capacity
across different countries, and therefore, requires states to take steps
"with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized" in the Covenant. 29 In 1990, the U.N. Committee on
25. See ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 9, at 363.
26. See my later discussion of the Indian Supreme Court's orders in PUCL vs. Union of
India and Others, Writ Petition [Civil] 196 of 2001, infra Part IV; see also ALSTON &
GOODMAN, supra note 9, at 352-53.
27. See ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 9, at 363-369.
28. See Pieterse, supra note 22, at 407-16.
29. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2, 1.
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) emphasized that the
"progressive realization" obligation, as it is called, is not a euphemism
freeing states from concrete responsibilities. 30 States are obligated, the
Committee clarified, to "move as expeditiously and effectively as
possible" toward securing social and economic rights for individuals. 31
Further, in relation to each right, states have a current rather than
longer-term obligation to provide "minimum essential levels of each of
the rights." 32 The "minimum core" obligation parallels the "immediate
33
obligation to respect and ensure" rights in the ICCPR.
National jurisprudence has not deployed this international
guidance. Judicial decisions that require a particular service to be
delivered could be understood as impliedly including that service in the
state's minimum, immediately effective obligations. However, courts
have not engaged with the concept of the minimum core or sought to
define it. Judicial reticence in this regard has been criticized by some
commentators. 34 Others, including Tushnet3 5 and Dixon, 36 are more
sanguine. Dixon suggests that courts should alleviate the democratic
deficit created by justiciable economic and social rights by recognizing
weak rights (e.g., applying a deferential standard of review or leaving
the state's obligations nebulous) or granting weak remedies (e.g.,
requiring a rights violation to be addressed but leaving method and
timing to the executive branch) when dealing with positive obligations
37
imposed by these rights.

30. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 3,
The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (art. 2, para. 1, of the Covenant), 5th Sess., Dec.
14, 1990, U.N. Doc E/1991/23, at 9 (Jan. 1, 1991) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment

3].
31. CESCR General Comment 3 at 9.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Cf. id. at
9 (contrasting the general "progressive realization" standard of the
ICESCR with the ICCPR).
34. See DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION AND

ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIc RIGHTS 135-77 (2007); Pieterse, supra note 22, at 407
(criticizing the South African Constitutional Court for its failure to define a minimum core
in Grootboom).
35. See TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 243-44, 247-50 (noting that the South African
Constitutional Court's rejection of "minimum core" in Grootboom was not a rejection of
justiciable socio-economic rights altogether and suggesting a difference between "weak"
and "strong" remedies for violations of rights).
36. See Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-form
Versus Weak-form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 391, 409-413 (2007)
(recognizing the trade-offs inherent in judicial review of positive rights).
37. See id. at 409-13. In the case of South Africa, Dixon argues for courts, when
recognizing weak social and economic rights, to apply stronger remedies to protect those
rights.
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As discussed earlier, justiciable social and economic rights are
relatively recent, as are the resulting litigation and judicial responses to
these rights. About two decades of experience across different
jurisdictions indicates that fears about the "judicialization" of
socioeconomic policy are misplaced, but also that the judicial role is,
perhaps unavoidably, narrow and reactive. Essentially modest decisions
by courts have generated few broadly applicable principles. When courts
have granted ambitious, large-scale remedies, they have struggled to
monitor government compliance. Courts have developed innovative
mechanisms-such as appointing experts, holding periodic hearings to
check on progress, or directing the national human rights institution to
monitor implementation-to track government compliance with judicial
directives. Despite such innovations, judges have struggled to
accurately assess compliance, and governments have often evaded or
38
neglected court orders.
2. Legislating Social and Economic Rights
Thus, while the status of socioeconomic rights as legitimate legal
entitlements is fairly settled, the scope and enforceability of these rights
remains moot. These issues could be tackled through legislation. Laws
recognizing and protecting socioeconomic rights could address the
concerns about legitimacy raised by judicial review. Once a law passes
with majority support in the legislature, its representativeness, at least
in a formal sense, is in little doubt. During litigation, a small set of
actors air their arguments, even accounting for submissions by experts
such as amicus curiae. Legislative debate over a draft law has the
potential to elicit broader civil society engagement, through individual
legislators, committees in the legislature, or public consultation. Law
making is likely to be more participatory not only as compared to
litigation, but also as compared to executive policy making.
The ICESCR requires states to take "all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures" 39 to advance
the rights in the Covenant. The ICESCR has reminded states that
legislation should ideally include judicial remedies. 40 More recently,
some multilateral agencies and human rights experts have championed
38. For a discussion of the difficulties in enforcing and monitoring compliance with
court decisions, see Dixon, supra note 36, at 414-15; and for a summary of remedial
innovation by Indian courts, see Christine M. Forster & Vedna Jivan, Public Interest
Litigation and Human Rights Implementation: The Indian and Australian Experience, 3
ASLAN J. COMP. L. 19-21 (2008).
39. ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 2, 1.
40. CESCR General Comment 3, supra note 30, 4-5.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

22:2

socioeconomic rights legislation.41 That said, there is still relatively
little detailed guidance on drafting laws on socioeconomic rights. The
Food and Agricultural Organization's handbook on legislating the right
42
to food is one of the few guides on how to legislate these rights. It
emphasizes the importance of clarifying rights and duties, assigning
duties to different levels of government, providing both administrative
and judicial remedies, protecting the right to information, and building
accountability mechanisms to guard against negligence and corruption.
Clearly, states could pass legislation that primarily performs a
functional, organizing role. But, legislation is also an apt vehicle for
robustly recognizing an enforceable right and building the necessary
framework to implement that right.
A law focusing on a socioeconomic right could particularize that
right. Defining the full scope of a right is challenging, particularly as
standards for socioeconomic rights are nowhere near as established as
for civil and political rights, but even clarifying the minimum
entitlements would be a valuable contribution. A law could also codify
the state's responsibilities and articulate harder-edged obligations than
are typically incorporated in policy documents. While a law should
define the state's minimum core obligations, it could also pin down
''progressive realization" targets-by establishing a system for setting
targets, developing benchmarks, and monitoring progress. Similarly, a
law can create mechanisms for cross-sectorial coordination as well as
lines of accountability. It provides an opportunity to synthesize domestic
practice and jurisprudence, as well as international standards and
comparative benchmarks.
Importantly, a law that defines an individual's rights and the state's
obligations will likely make it easier for individuals to challenge
violations. Challenging government actions on the basis of a
constitutional right requires specialized legal expertise and knowledge
of existing jurisprudence. A constitutional challenge resting on a
socioeconomic right is likely to be somewhat speculative and exploratory
as rights-specific precedents and comparative examples are quite
limited. Despite constitutional recognition, social and economic rights
continue to be difficult to enforce. Ordinary law, with its relative

41. See, e.g, Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General
Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the Covenant, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1998/24, at
6-8 (Dec. 1, 1998) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment 9]. See
generally DUBRAVKA BoJic BULTRINI, GUIDE ON LEGISLATING FOR THE RIGHT TO FOOD 53182. (2009) (explaining the need and providing direction for framework laws regarding the
right for food), available at http://www.fao.org/righttofood/publications/publicationsdetail/enlc/129278/ [hereinafter FAO Guide].
42. See FAO Guide, supranote 41.
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specificity, can provide the scaffolding that makes enforcement and
accountability more accessible.
Greater accessibility is potentially fostered not just by the details of
the law and the infrastructure it authorizes, but also by the fact of
legislation. A law, emerging from a process of discussion and debate
with the imprimatur of the legislature, is more likely to be viewed as
important, perhaps even as symbolic, than policy alone. It could,
therefore, serve as a tool for education and awareness, as shorthand for
a particular set of entitlements.
In addition to being perceived as significant, a law focusing on a
socioeconomic right is likely to provide firmer protection for the right
than a policy would. Policies are easier to change, and therefore, more
vulnerable to reversal when the government's priorities shift. Social
protection measures represent bargains across social classes (when the
poor receive support), across generations (when the elderly receive
support), and across time (when individuals' present-day earnings
contribute to eventual, future support). Unsurprisingly, social protection
is often politically fraught and sometimes jettisoned by governments
trying to distinguish themselves from the dispensation that preceded
them. Of course, policies that are very popular are difficult to reverse,
but legislation can serve as a faster way to entrench at least minimum
protection for social and economic rights. Repealing or amending a law
is more difficult than discarding or altering a policy. Thus, legislation
can serve as a commitment device that constrains future policy makers
and compels future legislators to debate and vote-in public, under
media scrutiny-on repeal or amendment.
This "stickiness" matters in relation to social and economic
entitlements, particularly for the poor in developing countries. Poverty
entails high, persistent risk. 43 A late monsoon or a drop in the world
market price for rice can be ruinous for a subsistence farmer. The
migrant contract worker in a third-world megacity can lose scarce work
over a late train, a fractured arm, or a flare-up of asthma. The work
that the poor do is itself often hazardous, and home provides little
sanctuary as living conditions tend to be unhealthy and unsafe,
particularly for women. 44 Constantly navigating risk exacts a
psychological, cognitive, and economic cost. 45 Economists have
demonstrated that the poor try to spread or minimize risk through
choices that, while understandable, are economically inefficient, such as
running three small businesses rather than one or clinging to
43. See ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL
RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 134-36 (2011).
44. See Chinkin, supra note 13, at 581-83.
45. See BANEWJEE & DUFLO, supra note 43, at 140-41.
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traditional technology rather than trying something unfamiliar that
would be more productive. 46 Stable social protection that cannot be
hastily altered would allow people living in poverty room to pursue
beneficial choices that might otherwise seem too much of a material and
emotional leap.
Thus, legislating social and economic rights potentially makes these
rights more accessible and the corresponding obligations on the state
firmer. Socioeconomic rights have had a protracted journey from public
international law to constitutional recognition to judicial enforcement
(in some states). Justiciability has posed genuine challenges and has
met with mixed success. Legislation is the next stage in the legalization
of social protection, and legislation has genuine benefits to offer
alongside, but also distinct from, other efforts to secure essential goods
and services as enforceable entitlements. While there is a wealth of
economic and public policy research on welfare policies, there is
relatively little doctrinal or socio-legal research on social protection
laws. As such, the Indian and Indonesian laws I examine here deserve
study. Of course, comparing Indian legislation with Indonesian laws
raises the challenges common to most comparative research. The
particular laws being compared have emerged from different legal
traditions and distinct political contexts. These differences are germane,
and I reflect on them below while also making the case for comparison.
II. THE CASE FOR COMPARISON
A. PoliticalDifferences
This article evaluates social protection laws that engage
constitutional rights. In comparing these laws, I am aware of Bell's
cautionary argument that public law is designed "as much in dialogue
with the past as with the future" and is therefore, "particularly
influenced by historical contingencies" and "anchored firmly in a
national setting."4 7 India and Indonesia have certainly had very
different trajectories in the twentieth century. Indonesia is a unitary
state with a presidential political system and a legislature produced by
proportional representation. India is a parliamentary federation, albeit
one where the balance of power lies with the central government. India
has a common law legal system, a legacy of British colonial rule, while
Indonesia has a hybrid pluralist legal system, combining civil law from

46. See id. at 141-43.
47. John Bell, ComparingPublic Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 235,
241 (Andrew Harding & Esin Ohibifeds., 2002).
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the Dutch colonial encounter with older, customary law, or adat, and
some elements of Islamic law. 45 Since India gained independence in
1947, it has been a constitutional democracy with regular, periodic
elections that have been reasonably free and fair. 49 The Indian economy
was heavily state controlled until the early 1990s, when the government
liberalized trade and capital markets. 50 Indonesia, on the other hand,
was an authoritarian state until 1998, when the Suharto regime fell in
the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Indonesia's economy
suffered more than that of any other Asian country during the crisis; its
GDP fell by 13 percent in 1998.51 The crisis exposed the extent of
plutocratic crony capitalism in Indonesia, with the public and private
52
sectors organized in the service of the Suharto family and its allies.
The years following 1998, known as the reformasi era, saw deep political
restructuring as Indonesia transitioned into a constitutional
democracy. 53 Thus, as compared to India, Indonesia is a far younger
democracy. When analyzing laws, it is worth bearing in mind that the
Indonesian legislature and judiciary were substantially controlled by
the executive until 1998, 54 and as a result, do not have a deep reserve of
experience with independent law making and adjudication.
B. ConstitutionalRecognition of Economic and Social Rights
Contrasts in each country's political trajectory are significant when
comparing legislation. It is also important to note that the laws being
compared deal with different forms of social protection. Addressing
widespread hunger in India and universalizing health insurance and
48. See Tim Lindsey & Mas Achmad Santosa, The Trajectory of Law Reform in
Indonesia: A Short Overview of Legal Systems and Change in Indonesia, in INDONESIA:
LAW AND SOCIETY 3 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2008).
49. See RAMACHANDRA GUHA, INDIA AFTER GANDHI: THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S

LARGEST DEMOCRACY 746-50 (2007) (detailing the professionalism of Indian civil service
and the apolitical nature of the Indian army, from India's founding).
50. Id. at 684-85.
51. SEE THEE KIAN WIE, INDONESIA'S ECONOMY SINCE INDEPENDENCE 120 (2012). See
also STEVEN RADELET & JEFFREY SACHS, THE EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: DIAGNOSIS,

REMEDIES, PROSPECTS (1998), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/hiid/
papers/bpeasia2.pdf (a contemporary economic analysis of the Asian financial crisis); PAUL
BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL

SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF 85-115 (2001) (a journalistic account of the crisis and the
IMF's response in Indonesia).
52. SEE BLUSTEIN, supra note 51, at 90-92; DONALD L. HOROWITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA 32 (2013).
53. SEE SIMON BuTT & TIM LINDSEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDONESIA: A CONTEXTUAL

ANALYSIS 26-157 (2012); HOROWITZ, supra note 52, at 30-54.
54. SEE BurT & LINDSEY, supra note 53, at 51-60, 77-78.
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pensions in Indonesia are all endeavors that raise their own particular,
thorny challenges. I highlight some of these particularities in Sections
III and IV below. That said, both the Indian and Indonesian laws that I
discuss are ambitious attempts to deliver particular forms of social
protection on a national scale in developing, middle-income countries.
These laws-and the social protection they create-were passed in
constitutional orders where socioeconomic rights are recognized and
have been judicially reviewed. As discussed in Section I, enforceable
socioeconomic rights are becoming more common but are still not
commonplace. Therefore, it is worth juxtaposing these recent laws and
seeing how they deal with the rights underlying them.
C. Socioeconomic Similarities
There are also socioeconomic similarities between India and
Indonesia that make comparative analysis compelling. Both countries
are very large and very diverse. India is the world's second largest
nation, with a population of 1.2 billion. 55 Indonesia has a population of
250 million, making it the world's fourth largest country. 56 Both
countries are home to an array of linguistic, ethnic, and religious
groups. Thus, in both countries, the state shares the challenge of
creating norms that can persuade and bind people across a range of
cultural contexts and of implementing laws and policies on a large scale.
57
Both Indonesia and India are lower-to-middle-income countries,
though Indonesia is the more economically prosperous of the two.
India's annual per capita income is $1,570,58 and Indonesia's-at
$3,58059-is approximately two-and-a-half times higher. India has far
more people who are poor in the absolute sense-it has the world's
largest number of extremely poor people, with 23.6 percent or 280
million Indians living on less than a $1.25 per day and 59.2 percent

55. SEE OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR GENERAL & CENSUS COMMISSIONER, INDIA, CENSUS
OF INDIA 2011, FIGURES AT A GLANCE, available at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/

2011census/population enumeration.aspx (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
56. SEE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS: POPULATION DYNAMICS,

available at http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.1 (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
57. Both India and Indonesia are classified as lower-middle-income countries (i.e.,
those with a GNI per capita within the range $1,046 to $4,125). COUNTRY AND LENDING
GROUPS,

WORLD

BANK,

http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#

Lowermiddleincome (lastvisited Dec. 6, 2014).
58. Poverty and Equity: India, WORLD BANK, http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/
country/IND (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
WORLD
BANK,
Equity:
Indonesia,
59. Poverty
and
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/IDN (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
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living on less than $2.00 per day. 60 In Indonesia, 16.2 percent of the
population survives on less than $1.25 per day, and 43.3 percent lives on
less than $2.00 per day. 61 However, poverty has been falling fairly
steadily in both India and Indonesia, 62 and declining poverty means
that people who are poor aspire to better standards of living, more
education for their children, and greater social mobility. When the
hopes of the poor are less modest, stark and rising inequality can spark
serious friction. At the same time, as material conditions improve,
people are better placed to demand more from the state. Thus, there are
arguably greater expectations of the state in both countries to cushion
the difficult lives of their poorest citizens, as economic growth provides
more resources to do so.
Underprivileged Indians and Indonesians encounter public services
that are inadequate and, far too often, corrupt. Official corruption
thrives in both countries, both at the junior, citizen-facing end of the
spectrum as well as at the higher reaches of political power. India ranks
85th out of 177 countries on Transparency International's corruption
perception index, scoring a meager 38 out of 100 points, where a score of
63
100 would mean the public sector was perceived to be very clean.
Indonesia ranks even lower, and ranks 114th out of 177 countries on the
same index. It scores 34 out of 100 points, indicating that the public

60. See Poverty and Equity: India, supra note 58 (showing a table with the percentage
of population living at each poverty indicator in India when placing the cursor on the
given bar graph).
61. See Poverty and Equity: Indonesia, supra note 59 (showing a table with the
percentage of population living at each poverty indicator in Indonesia when placing the
cursor on the given bar graph).
62. The percentage of Indians living on $1.25 a day fell from 42% in 2005 to 23.6% in
2011. See Poverty and Equity: India, supra note 58 (displaying the information on bar
graphs with a tab for each year). The percentage of Indonesians living on $1.25 a day fell
from 22% in 2005 to 16.2% in 2011. See Poverty and Equity: Indonesia, supra note 59
(displaying the information on bar graphs with tabs for each year). While absolute poverty
has fallen in both countries, individual income inequality has risen in Indonesia over the
past decade (though remained fairly steady in India). Indonesia's Gini index rose from
29.0 in 1999 to 38.1 in 2011. See id. at Country Inequality Trend Graph. India's Gini index
was 33.4 in 2004 and 33.6 in 2012. See Poverty and Equity: India, supra note 58, at
Country Inequality Trend Graph. The Gini index measures the extent to which the
distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 implies
perfect equality, while an index of 100 would mean perfect inequality. GINI INDEx(WORLD
BANK ESTIMATE), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI (last
visited Jan. 5, 2015).
63. Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.
transparency.org/country#IND (last visited May 15, 2015).
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sector is perceived to be very corrupt. 64 While petty corruption is the
lived experience of many, the vast gains from elite rent seeking and
nepotism regularly garner headlines. In recent years, political
corruption has emerged as an influential electoral issue in India. 65 In
Indonesia, anger over the New Order regime's corruption drove protests
against the Suharto government and ultimately brought down President
Suharto in 1998.66 Since then, successive governments have pledged
measures to curb government corruption,67 and it remains a live and
emotive issue in Indonesian public life. Any ambitious social protection
initiative in either country must grapple with the endemic corruption
that deprives people of the goods and services ostensibly being
delivered. It is, therefore, worth examining how India and Indonesia
have attempted to build accountability into recent social protection
laws.
In summary, both Indonesia and India currently face similar
demographic and economic challenges as well as opportunities. Both
countries have democratic institutions and constitutionally protected
rights, providing citizens with both formal and informal ways to
pressure the state. State institutions in both countries function poorly,
weakened not just by entrenched corruption but also by deep inequities
in power and resources. Those shared fundamentals allow for a
meaningful comparison between social protection laws in India and
Indonesia, albeit one cognizant of the important differences between the
two countries.

64. Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.
transparency.org/country#IDN (last visited May 15, 2015).
65. See Corruption in India: A Million Rupees Now, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 2011,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18338852; see also India's Election and the
Economy: A Useful Campaign, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2014, available at http://www.
economist.com/news/asia/21597949-electioneering-focuses-economy-suggests-welcomerealisation-growth-matters; Andrew Buncombe, Indian Election 2014: Corruption and
Infrastructureon the Agenda During Biggest Poll So Far,INDEPENDENT, Apr. 10, 2014,
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/indian-election-2014-corruptionand-infrastructure-on-the-agenda-during-biggest-poll-so-far-9250769.html;
Laurence
Cockcroft, Despite the Election, India Still Isn't Confronting Corruption, FOREIGN POL'Y,
(May 2, 2014, 5:35 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/02/despite-the-election-india-stillisnt-confronting-corruption; Niharika Mandhana, Upstart Party Scores Victory in India
State Elections, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2015, 8:13 AM, http://www.wsj.com/articles/delhielections-aam-aadmi-party-sweeps-to-victory- 1423535589.
66. See Sofie Arjon Schiitte, Government Policies and Civil Society Initiatives Against
Corruption, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA 81 (Marco Biinte &
Andreas Ufen eds., 2009).
67. See id.
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III. A LAW TO FEED THE POOR IN INDIA
The Indian Parliament passed the National Food Security Act, 2013
(NFSA or "the Act") on September 10, 2013. The Act's avowed aim is to
"provide for food and nutritional security . . . by ensuring access to
adequate quantity of quality food at affordable prices" so that people can
"live a life with dignity." 68 The NFSA divided opinion among policy
professionals and reportedly even among senior members of the
government that proposed the law, 69 with many commentators
70
considering it fiscally irresponsible and potentially ineffectual.
However, while opponents prescribed policies at variance with the Act,

few argued that access to food in India was adequate. India has one of
the highest rates of undernutrition in the world, notably higher than
71
countries with lower rates of economic growth and per capita income.

68. The National Food Security Act, No. 20 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013), pmbl.
69. See e.g., Smita Gupta, NAC Disappointed with Government Draft of Food Security
Bill, HINDU, July 22, 2011, available at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-

national/tp-otherstates/nac-disappinted-with-gvernment-draftof-food-security-bill
article2283919.ece (explaining that many NAC members felt that the final bill was not
true to the original intent).
70. For a critical commentary, see Ila Patnalk, Right Hand, Left Hand, INDIAN
EXPRESS, Feb. 5, 2013, 3:25 AM, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/right-hand-lefthand11069303/3, and Sadanand Dhume, New Delhi's Hunger Games, WALL ST. J., June
20, 2013, 12:49 PM, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323393804578557
050745156758. For a summary of the debate, see Avinash Kishore et al., India's Right to
Food Act: A Novel Approach to Food Security, in 2013 GLOBAL FOOD POLICY REPORT

(International Food Policy Research Institute, 2013), http://www.ifpri.org/gfpr/2013/indiasright-to-food-act?print; and Soutwik Biswas, Is India's Food Security Bill the Magic Pill?,
BBC (July 3, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-23159706.
71. See UNICEF Data: Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women,
Undernourishmentin the womb can lead to diminishedpotential and predispose infants to
early death, UNICEF (Nov. 2014), http://www.data.unicef.org/nutrition/low-birthweight

(explaining that 28 percent of Indian newborns weigh less than 2,500 grams (or 5.5.
pounds), which means they have low birth weight); see also UNICEF Data: Monitoring the
Situation of Children and Women, Undernutrition contributes to half of all deaths in
children under 5 and is widespread in Asia and Africa, UNICEF (Feb. 2015),
http://data.unicef.org/nutritior/malnutrition (showing that over 40% of children under five
have stunted growth in India); Nutrition Landscape Information System: Country Profile
India, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://apps.who.int/nutrition/landscape/report.aspx?iso=
IND&rid=1620&goButton=Go (last visited June 10, 2015) (describing that 43.5% of Indian
children under five years are underweight for their age and that 17.5% of the population is
below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption).
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A. Policy Background
Millions of Indians live in chronic hunger, despite a number of
government programs that aim to provide food to the hungry.7 2 A
handful of these are national programs, formulated and financed by the
Central Government in New Delhi.7 3 The governments of India's
twenty-nine states have devised and financed several programs aimed
at providing food to the hungry. The national government has long
subsidized Indian farmers to ensure sufficient agricultural productionthe government guarantees that it will buy set amounts of food grain at
a "minimum support price." 74 Other policies focus on food consumers
rather than producers. Some programs subsidize the cost of staple food,
such as rice or grain. A long-standing national program supplements
staple food with small allowances of protein and cooking oil for the very
poor. The national midday meal policy provides primary school children
in public schools with school lunches.75 Food benefits under these
various policies are distributed through a nation-wide network of shops
and storage facilities called the public distribution system (the PDS).76
Indian food policy is criticized for being needlessly cumbersome,
costly, and interventionist. Critics argue that malnutrition results not
from a lack of food supply, but from households being unable to afford
enough food; from lack of clean water and sanitation facilities, which
leads to illness; and from social norms such as families giving girls less
food than boys. 7 7 Therefore, some policy experts argue that governments
should simply supplement the incomes of the poor through food

72. For a summary of national policies on food aid, see Food Schemes, SUPREME COURT
COMMISSIONERS (2011), http://www.sccommissioners.org/FoodSchemes/foodschemes.html.
73. These include the Antodaya Anna Yojana, the Integrated Child Development
Scheme, the Mid-day Meal Scheme and the Targeted Public Distribution System. For a
summary of national policies on food aid, see Food Schemes, supra note 72.
74. Shikha Jha, Food Procurement Policy, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO EcONOMIcS
IN INDIA 196, 196-197 (Kaushik Basu ed., 2007).
75. See Mid Day Meal Scheme, MINISTRY OF HUMAN RES. DEV., http://mdm.nic.inl (last
visited July 10, 2014).
76. See Targeted Public Distribution System, DEP'T OF FOOD AND PUB. DISTRIB.,
http://dfpd.nic.in/?q=node/101 (last visited July 10, 2014).
77. On factors affecting nutrition, see generally LINDSAY H. ALLEN & STUART R.
GILLESPIE, WHAT WORKS? A REVIEW OF THE EFFICACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NUTRITION

INTERVENTIONS (Joseph M. Hunt, ed., United Nations ACC Sub-Committee on Nutrition
& Asian Development Bank 2001) (reviewing attempts and programs nutrition
intervention worldwide), available at http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/
whatworks.pdf.
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vouchers or cash transfers, rather than running food storage and food
78
distribution networks that are inefficient and corrupt.
However, many left-leaning policy experts like Dr~ze and Khera
reject these criticisms, pointing out that current policies work well in
several states and poorly in others, demonstrating that the Indian
government needs to muster political will and accountability rather
than devise new policy. 79 They argue that food-insecure families would
suffer if left to the vagaries of local markets, and they point out that the
poor are aware of, invested in, and have expressed preferences for the
legacy system.80 Therefore, these economists press for improving the
implementation of the existing food programs and for tackling
corruption in the delivery system.
The NFSA emerged from this policy context and attendant debate.
However, the specific demand for a law was influenced by public
interest litigation that challenged particular food policy failures. During
the long-running PUCL case, discussed in more detail below, the
Supreme Court of India ("Supreme Court") recognized an individual
right to food. The Supreme Court's articulation of this right, in turn,
gave civil society groups a lever with which to demand a law on food for
the poor.
B. ConstitutionalFramework
Judicial recognition of the right to food followed a body of
jurisprudence recognizing social and economic rights that are not
81
included in the Indian Constitution's catalogue of fundamental rights.
All of the rights recognized in the Constitution as fundamental-except
one, the right to education-are civil and political rights."8 2 Basic goods
78. See Patnalk, supra note 70, for policy arguments against distributing food grain
rather than cash, and see Dhume, supra note 70, for similar arguments by a journalist.
For a summary of the debate about whether the government should distribute food grain
or cash to the poor, see Lola Nayar, The Ration Card Route, OUTLOOK, Dec. 30, 2013,
available at http://www.outlookindia.com/article/The-Ration-Card-Route/288912.
79. See Jean Dr~ze & Reetika Khera, Revival of the Public Distribution System:
Evidence and Explanations, ECON. & POL. WEEKLY, Nov. 5, 2011, at 36 (explaining the
problems within the public distribution system); see also Jean Drbze & Reetika Khera,
Rural Poverty and the Public DistributionSystem, ECON. & POL. WEEKLY, Nov. 16, 2013,
at 55 (explaining the impact of a public distribution system on rural poverty).
80. See Jean Dr~ze & Reetika Khera, Food vs. Cash, OUTLOOK, Mar. 24, 2014,
available at http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Food-Vs-Cash/289804 (explaining poor
families' dependence on the Public Distribution System).
81. INDIA CONST. arts. 12-35.
82. INDIA CONST. art. 21A, amended by The Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment)
Act, 2002 (recognizing the fundamental right of all children aged six to fourteen years to
free and compulsory education).
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and services such as healthcare, water, food, and sanitation were not
included as fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution, but were
included as "Directive Principles of State Policy."8 3 The principles are
meant to shape government policy and priorities-they are
"fundamental in the governance of the country" but, expressly, are not
"enforceable by any court."8 4 The Supreme Court has diluted that
restriction through a series of decisions in response to public interest
litigation (PIL) focusing on vulnerable groups. In PIL decisions
involving social and economic rights since the 1980s, the Supreme Court
of India has drawn on the directive principles to interpret the
constitutional right to life-further holding that a meaningful
conception of the right to life encompasses rights to water, shelter,
education, emergency medical care, and a decent environment.8 5 For
example, in Francis CoralieMullin, Justice Bhagwati said:
We think that the right to life includes the right to live
with human dignity and all that goes along with it,
namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate
nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading,
writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely
moving about . . . and co-mingling with fellow human
86
beings.
The Indian Supreme Court has, in effect, acknowledged that
socioeconomic necessities can be treated as justiciable rights and can be
enforced by the judiciary. In PIL cases, the Supreme Court devised
special remedies such as appointing expert rapporteurs and using
"continuing mandamus"-a series of interim orders issued at periodic
87
court hearings-to monitor government progress on judicial directions.
This jurisprudence was well established when an NGO, the People's
Union of Civil Liberties, filed a public interest petition in April 2001 on

83. These are contained in Part IV of the Constitution, titled "Directive Principles of
State Policy." INDIA CONST. arts. 36-51.
84. INDIA CONST. arts. 36-51.
85. See, e.g., Singh v. Pradesh, (1995) 6 S.C.R. Supp. 827 (India); Mullin v. Adm'r,
Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516 (India); Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985)
2 S.C.R. Supp. 51 (India); Paschim Bangal Khet Mazdoor Samity ORS. v. W. Bengal,
(1996) 4 S.C.C. 37 (India) (providing a sample of the Supreme Court of India's decisions);
see also Surabhi Chopra, Holding the State Accountable for Hunger, 44 ECON. & POL.
WEEKLY, Aug. 15, 2009, at 8, 10; Forster & Jivan, supra note 38, at 4-6.
86. Mullin v. Adm'r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 518 (India).
87. Chopra, supra note 85, at 11; Forster & Jivan, supra note 38, at 16, 18.
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behalf of people facing acute hunger in north and east India.8 The
petition challenged government failure to assist the rural poor in these
regions, many of them subsistence farmers, whose livelihoods had been
so badly hurt by a few years of consecutive drought that they could no
longer afford sufficient food. The petitioners claimed that the failure of
welfare programs to effectively distribute food in these circumstances
violated state obligations under the constitutional right to life.8 9 They
argued, in effect, that the right to life included within it the right to be
free from hunger.
The Supreme Court, consistent with its approach to other essential
goods and services, responded favorably to the petitioners-impliedly
concurring that the right to food was indeed a part of the fundamental
right to life. 90 The Court added several state governments from different
parts of India as respondents in the case and asked officials to report on
the status of food welfare programs. 91 In the following years, the Court
issued interim orders that, inter alia, converted the benefits of nine
nutrition programs into legal entitlements and expanded coverage of
primary school midday meals and other child welfare programs. 92 Since
corruption was a chronic obstacle at the village level, the Supreme
93
Court directed greater transparency in implementing food programs,
requiring that court orders and lists of eligible beneficiaries be
prominently displayed in the local language at government buildings
and PDS shops across India. It further ordered that members of the
public at the village level were entitled to initiate social audits of those
schemes. 94 Left-leaning civil society groups coalesced around this longrunning PIL and, over time, began demanding a law to ensure adequate
food for the poor. Their campaign found some traction with the national
88. People Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 196 of 2001, civil writ of petition,
para. 2, 25, 31, available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/petition.html.
89. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
90. Supreme Court of India, Order of July 23, 2001 in People Union for Civil Liberties
v. Union of India, 196 of 2001, civil writ of petition, available at http://www.
righttofoodindia.orglorders/july23.html.
91. Id.
92. Supreme Court of India, Order of Nov. 28, 2001 in People Union for Civil Liberties
v. Union of India, 196 of 2001, civil writ of petition, para. 1-8, available at http://www.
righttofoodindia.orglorders/nov28.html; Supreme Court of India, Order of Apr. 20, 2004 in
People Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 196 of 2001, civil writ of petition,
available at http://www.righttofoodindia.orgtorders/apr2704.html.
93. Supreme Court of India, Order of Nov. 28, 2001 in People Union for Civil Liberties
v. Union of India, 196 of 2001, civil writ of petition, para. 9-11, available at http://www.
righttofoodindia.orglorders/nov28.html.
94. Supreme Court of India, Order of May 8, 2001 in People Union for Civil Liberties v.
Union of India, 196 of 2001, civil writ of petition, para. (f), available at http://www.
righttofoodindia.org/orders/may8.html.
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government, 95 but given the deep divisions among policy experts, it took
a few years to develop a draft law that the government supported
enough to place before the Parliament and put to a vote.
C. The Ambit of the Law
Thus, the National Food Security Act was preceded by protracted
public interest litigation and sits atop various national and state
policies. The Act creates the framework within which governments must
deliver food benefits and assigns obligations in this regard. It lays down
what individuals are entitled to. It also attempts to create a mechanism
for holding governments accountable when they fail to meet their
obligations.
1. Entitlements
A "first principles" approach to food entitlements would factor in the
different types of food needed for a balanced, healthy diet, drawing on
widely accepted nutritional guidelines formulated by expert bodies such
as the World Health Organization. 96 For example, the Food and
Agricultural Organization advises defining food or nutrition security as,
inter alia, stable access to a nutritious diet, as well as to sufficient
97
water, healthcare, and sanitation to utilize nutrition adequately.
Many states would not be able to provide food security defined in this
way, but following the ICESCR, those states could work toward meeting
this standard while providing the maximum that is currently feasible.
The NFSA neither draws on expert guidelines nor sets an
aspirational standard to be progressively realized. Instead, under the
Act, individuals in households falling below the official poverty line get
a specified amount of food-five kilograms of grain-every month at
subsidized rates from PDS shops. 98 Households that are identified as
extremely poor get an additional quota of subsidized grain-thirty-five
kilograms-every month. 99 The Act does not define food or nutrition
95. See INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, LOK SABHA ELECTIONS 2009 MANIFESTO OF THE

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (2009), available at http://inc.in/documents/electiondoc/manifesto09-eng.pdf (during national elections in 2009, the election manifesto of the
Indian National Congress, which led the ruling United Progress Alliance, included a
pledge "to enact a Right to Food law that guarantees access to sufficient food for all people,
particularly the most vulnerable sections of society").
96. See WHO Guidelines on Nutrition, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.intl
publications/guidelines/nutrition/en! (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
97. FAO Guide, supra note 41, at 73.
98. The National Food Security Act, No. 20 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013), § 3(1).
99. Id.
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more generally and defines "food security" simply as the "supply of the
entitled quantity of food grains." 100 If the government fails to supply
food-grain to an eligible individual, the NFSA entitles that person to a
monetary allowance in lieu of grain. The national government has the
power to lay down the amount of the allowance and the procedure for
claiming it.101 Up to 75 percent of India's rural population and up to 50
percent of its urban population can be put into the category of people
02
entitled to subsidized grain.
2. Obligations
While the entitlement to food-grain is narrow, delivering it in a
country as large as India is complicated, and the NFSA imposes
obligations on national, state, and local governments in this regard. The
national government is bound, under the Act, to "ensure" the regular
supply of grain to eligible households. 103 To do this, the relevant
national ministries in New Delhi must procure grain, allocate it among
different states, and arrange for it to be transported across India in the
requisite quantities. 104 Since the Act is legalizing what was previously a
policy commitment, if the national government cannot procure enough
grain within India, it would now be obligated to import the shortfall
despite the fiscal burdens this might impose.
It is the governments of India's twenty-nine states that are
responsible for implementing the details of the NFSA. The Act makes
them responsible for implementing the full range of national and statespecific food welfare programs'0 5 and ensuring "actual delivery of
entitled benefits."'1 6 In practice, this legal obligation includes multiple,
interconnected steps cutting across a range of public bodies: ensuring
that grain is stored properly; ensuring that grain reaches PDS shops
rather than being diverted to private wholesalers; and ensuring that
shops open as required, display information about prices and NFSA
entitlements, and do not dilute or contaminate the grain to make it
stretch further. Most fundamentally, state governments must identify
the individuals and households who are poor and extremely poor, and
07
therefore, entitled to food benefits. 1

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 2(6).
§ 8.
§ 3(2).
§ 22(1).
§ 22.
§ 24.
§ 24(3).

107. Id. § 10(1).
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Within each state, local governments play a crucial role in ensuring
delivery to the individual and guarding against the inefficiencies and
corruption within the food distribution system. Local-level officials
identify households and individuals eligible for food-grain and check
that the community PDS shop functions well. Clearly, a corrupt official
at the grassroots level could undermine the Act, making food-security
subject to patronage and payment. Local officials' "last mile" role
notwithstanding, the NFSA does not detail their obligations. Instead,
the Act assigns local authorities the general responsibility to ensure
"proper implementation ...in their respective areas"108 and obligates
them to do what the state government asks of them. 09
This allows the state government to be flexible and sensitive to
context. Food provision in Himalayan villages in northern India might
require different systems from villages in the drought-prone plains of
the northwest. At the same time, leaving state governments to set locallevel standards allows regional disparities in public services to
persist." 0 For example, the government of the southern state of Tamil
Nadu, which provides reasonably efficient public services, might impose
more exacting duties on local authorities than the government of Uttar
Pradesh in the north, which has a long record of poor service delivery.
3. Special Measures for Vulnerable Groups
Just as the NFSA leaves local authority regulation to state
governments, it also leaves to them the question of special measures for
vulnerable groups. Under the ICESCR, states have a specific obligation
to prevent discrimination in access to economic and social rights."' This
obligation, which falls within a state's immediately effective, minimum
core duties," 2 is very relevant in India's deeply unequal context.
Historically disadvantaged caste groups, tribal communities, and
particular religious minorities are overrepresented among India's poor
(and therefore, among people living with chronic hunger). These groups
108. Id. § 25.
109. Id. § 26.
110. See Ankita Aggarwal, Why Bihar's Child is Different from Himachal's, INDIA
TOGETHER (Apr. 8, 2014), http://indiatogether.org/how-icds-works-in-different-stateschildren; Jean Drbze & Reetika Khera, Water For The Leeward India, OUTLOOK, Mar. 24,
2014, available at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?289801.
111. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, 2, Dec.
16, 1966, U.N.T.S. 1-14531.

112. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20, NonDiscrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2), May 4-22, 2009,
7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (May 25, 2009) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment 20];
CESCR General Comment 3, supra note 30, 1, 5.
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continue to face discrimination in public life, including in access to
public services. 113 Cutting across different groups, women in India are
considerably less free and less safe than their male compatriots, both in
private and in public. The female-to-male ratio in India is one of the
lowest in the world, 1 4 resulting not just from sex-selective abortion of
female fetuses, but also higher mortality rates for young girls as
compared to young boys. Gendered neglect and disregard of young girls
runs so deep that proportionately more girls die in infancy and those
who survive have less access to schooling, healthcare, and food as they
115
grow.
The NFSA lays down special entitlements for women and children,
but avoids clear-cut measures for other groups. Instead, the Act vaguely
exhorts state governments to "give special focus" to the needs of
"vulnerable groups," "especially in remote areas and other areas which
are difficult to access, hilly and tribal areas for ensuring their food
security," 6 leaving room for group benefits but not requiring them.
The nutritional needs of young children receive special protection in
the Act. Children aged six to fourteen years are entitled to a free lunch
every day in public or government-aided schools. 117 Children below
school-going age are similarly entitled to a free meal at their local public
childcare center." 8 These provisions put on a statutory footing a longrunning food-welfare program. The midday meal program has been in
place for over ten years across India, and provides weekday lunches to
over 120 million children. 1 9 Research shows that student enrollment,
attendance, 20 and retention' 2' in primary schools have risen as a result
of the program. Given India's high rates of malnutrition in children, free
school lunches have direct nutritional benefits for children from families

113. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN APARTHEID: CASTE DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST INDIA'S UNTOUCHABLES 39, 41 (2007), available at http:/lwww.hrw.org/reports
2007/india02O7/2.htm (Hidden Apartheid was produced as a "shadow report" to the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination).
114. See, Gender Composition, OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR GEN. & CENSUS COMM'R,
INDIA, censusindia.gov.in/Census And_You/gender-composition.aspx (last visited Apr. 23,
2015) (the sex ratio in India in 2011 was 940 women to 1000 men).
115. JEAN DRtZE & AMARTYA SEN, INDIA: DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION 229-234
(2002).
116. The National Food Security Act, No. 20 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013), § 30.
117. Id. § 5(1)(b).
118. Id. § 5(1)(a).
119. Reetika Khera, Mid-Day Meals: Looking Ahead, ECON. & POL. WEEKLY, Aug. 10,
2013, available at http://www.epw.in/commentary/mid-day-meals-looking-ahead.html.
120. See Farzana Afridi, The Impact of School Meals on School Participation:Evidence
from Rural India, 47 J. DEV. STUD. 1636, 1652 (2011).
121. Khera, supra note 119.
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living on the brink of hunger. 122 Proponents of the program argue that it
also has more diffuse advantages, such as weakening persistent caste
taboos, as children from traditionally "low" and "high" castes eat the
same food, side by side.' 23 The program is popular with parents, which
has led different governments to support it regardless of the particular
political party in power.' 24 So, in putting the midday meal program on a
statutory footing, the NFSA is not actually creating new protections for
young children, but is making an existing, popular, and effective
measure more secure.
Some of the NFSA's provisions on women are potentially more
contentious. Under the Act, pregnant women and lactating mothers are
entitled to a free meal every day during pregnancy and for six months
after giving birth, supplemented by monetary maternity benefits of
approximately one hundred dollars. 25 These prenatal and postnatal
entitlements are unlikely to be controversial. However, the NFSA
recognizes women not just as child bearers but as citizens and public
actors. The oldest woman in a household is designated, under the Act,
as the "head of the household" who holds the necessary eligibility
documents and collects the family's food entitlements. 126 Only if a
household has no adult women can the oldest man in the family serve as
head of household, but the Act requires that he cede this role when a
127
girl in the family turns eighteen.
Granting women exclusive authority to collect food disbursements
reflects the practical reality that women cook food within the home and,
when food is scarce, bear the burden of stretching what is available to
feed their families. In addition, this measure also reflects recent
research that suggests welfare gains, particularly for children, are
higher when women influence how families use public goods and
services. 128 These provisions build on past efforts by the state in India to
122. See Farzana Afridi, Child Welfare Programs and Child Nutrition: Evidence from a
Mandated School Meal Program in India, 92 J. DEV. EcON. 152, 158-62 (2010).
123. Khera, supra note 119.
124. Id.
125. The National Food Security Act, No. 20 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013), § 4.
126. Id. § 13.
127. Id. § 13(2).
128. DRtZE & SEN, supra note 115, at 271-74; For a discussion on the effects of women's
engagement with public services, see, for example, Eleanor MacPherson, Invisible Agents:
Women in Service Delivery Reforms, 38 INST. DEV. STUD. BULL. 38, 39-40 (2008);
Benjamin Davis et al., The Lure of Tequila and the Bestowing of Motherly Love: Does it
Matter Whether Public Cash Transfers are Given to Women or Men? Evidence from the
PROGRESA and PROCAMPO Programsin Rural Mexico (Euro. Ass'n Agric. Economists,
2002); Xiaohui Hou, Women's Decision Making Power and Human Development: Evidence
from Pakistan (World Bank, Human Development Social Protection Unit, South Asia
Region, Working Paper No. 5830, 2011), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/external/
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strengthen women's agency. For example, during village council
elections in India, leadership positions are reserved for women in a
fraction of randomly chosen councils. In another example, many
129
microcredit providers in South Asia prioritize giving loans to women.
Despite strong cultural constraints, women have asserted themselves in
these roles. 130 The NFSA takes seriously the lessons from these past
experiences. In much of India, neither cultural norms nor religious law
would countenance a woman being the head of her household. By
designating women as such, this law recognizes intersecting forms of
vulnerability and stitches the effort to shift women's low status into the
overarching aim of providing food to the poor.
D. Accountability Measures
The aim animating the NFSA is getting food-in particular basic
staple grains-into the hands of those who cannot afford to feed
themselves. Past experience shows that many people cannot rely on
accessing food benefits because they are left off the list of eligible
beneficiaries or because their local PDS shop does not open when it
should. Since the NFSA largely preserves preexisting policies, those
problems remain relevant. In response, the Act puts in place different
mechanisms to monitor government performance.
The NFSA authorizes the national government to appoint
independent auditors to evaluate welfare programs.13 1 Variations
among states could be highlighted using this power, nudging state
governments that perform poorly to improve. While allowing the central
government in New Delhi to initiate professional audits, the Act
requires local governments to conduct regular "social audits" on welfare
programs as well as on PDS shops.1 32 Community residents are to be

default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469382&piPK=64165421&menuPK=641660
93&entityID=000158349_20111005120527.
129. There is considerable literature on the effects of microcredit programs focused on
women. See, e.g., Supriya Garikipati, The Impact of Lending to Women on Household
Vulnerability and Women's Empowerment: Evidence from India, 36 WORLD DEV. 2620
(2008) (finding that although lending programs benefit households, they fail to empower
women); Naila Kabeer, Conflicts Over Credit: Re-Evaluating the Empowerment Potential
of Loans to Women in Rural Bangladesh, 29 WORLD DEV. 63 (2001) (examining the
different conclusions reached by evaluations of credit programs for rural women in
Bangladesh); Syed M. Hashemi et al., Rural Credit Programsand Women's Empowerment
in Bangladesh, 24 WORLD DEV. 635 (1996) (studying two credit programs to rural women
in Bangladesh, and finding that they have significant effects on empowerment).
130. BANERJEE & DuFLO, supra note 43, at 250-51.
131. The National Food Security Act, No. 20 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013), § 4.
132. Id. §§ 2(20), 28.
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included among the auditors, and audit results must be made public.
Social audits are an established part of the civil society toolbox in rural
India. In response to poor public services, many Indian NGOs began
organizing unofficial public hearings and performance audits in the
1990s,133 sometimes in partnership with government 34 and sometimes
in opposition to it. Goetz and Jenkins observe that citizens have usually
been restricted to "vertical" modes of holding government accountablelobbying interspersed periodically by voting-and argue that civil
society in India is trying to insert itself into "horizontal" accountability
processes through audits, public hearings, and public interest
litigation. 135 To harness the potential of what they term "hybrid
accountability," Goetz and Jenkins recommend that laws and policies
should formalize citizens' scrutiny of government performance by giving
NGO observers legal standing to observe the full scope of a public
authority's work as well as structured access to official records. 136 The
NFSA takes this advice, at least partially, and incorporates civil society
participation at the grassroots. In addition to institutionalizing
community oversight, the Act requires that all official records tied to
food distribution be proactively disclosed and readily available for
37
inspection by members of the public.1
Social audits provide a platform for local residents to evaluate how
effectively food is being delivered, but the government initiates the
evaluative exercise. However, the NFSA also allows individuals to
complain or "file a grievance" with a local official if they are denied the
grain to which they are entitled. 38 State governments are also required
by the Act to set up complaints mechanisms such as call centers and
help lines.1 39 This provision might seem like an unnecessary point of
detail, but it is a useful response to the lived experience of welfare
beneficiaries. Individuals are routinely deprived of benefits, but
complaining about this deprivation is difficult. The indigent citizen, in
particular, typically approaches officials as a supplicant, often waiting
hours for an audience. In this context, requiring proactive disclosure of
information, accessible complaint mechanisms, and participatory

133. See Anne Marie Goetz & Rob Jenkins, Hybrid Forms of Accountability: Citizen
Engagement in Institutionsof Public-Sector Oversight in India, 3 PUB.MGMT. R. 363, 37075 (2001), for an early example of using social audits to monitor food welfare programs in
India.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 364.
136. Id. at 369.
137. The National Food Security Act, No. 20 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013), § 27.
138. Id. § 14.
139. Id.
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performance audits signals a conscious attempt to make local
government more accountable to individuals.
Higher up the administrative chain, the Act requires the
government of each state to set up a quasi-independent watchdog, or
"Food Commission," to monitor implementation of the Act. 140 Each Food
Commission is financed by the respective state government, which also
has the power to appoint and remove members, albeit within
parameters set by the NFSA.141 Commissioners are drawn both from
inside and outside the government. 142 The Food Commission is required
to advise the government on food policy and programs. 143 In addition, it
has the authority to receive complaints from individuals, both in an
appellate and in an original capacity. Someone unhappy with the
response from the local government grievance officer can appeal to the
Food Commission. 144 The Food Commission can also receive direct
complaints about "violations of entitlements" and can inquire on its own
145
initiative into actual or suspected violations.
Whether responding to a complaint or initiating its own
investigation, the Food Commission's powers of inquiry are
considerable. It is endowed with "all the powers of a civil court while
trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure." 146 With these powers,
the Food Commission can summon and examine under oath anyone it
considers appropriate, order discovery and production of documents,
and requisition official public records from anywhere in India.
Proceedings before a food commission are a serious mattercommissioners can initiate criminal proceedings for contempt of court
against parties if necessary. 147 However, a food commission cannot issue
binding orders as a court of law would be able to-it can only
recommend a particular course of action to the government.
Thus, the NFSA sets up a handful of different mechanisms to
evaluate government performance in general as well as to raise
individual complaints. Indonesian laws on social security, which are
discussed below, share that concern with accountability.

140. Id. § 16(1).
141. Id. § 16(9).
142. Id. § 16.
143. Id. § 16(6)(c)-(d).
144. Id. § 16(6)(e).
145. Id. § 16(6)(b).
146. Id. § 20(1).
147. Under Section 20(2) of the NFSA, a food commission can pass a case on to a judicial
magistrate where it is treated as originating in a police complaint by the commission, and
charged and tried under section 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CODE CRIM.
PROC. § 346).
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IV. CREATING "CRADLE TO GRAVE" SOCIAL SECURITY IN INDONESIA

The Indonesian legislature, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House
of Representatives, passed the law concerning the National Social
Security System 148 (Undang Undang Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional or
SJSN) in September 2004. In order to create a "national social security
system," SJSN mandates multiple types of social security for
Indonesians, including health insurance, old-age pensions, work
accident insurance, and death benefits. 149 Seven years later, in 2011, the
legislature followed SJSN with the law concerning the Social Security
Administrative Body' 50 (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial or "the
BPJS law"), which created institutions to implement the social security
system required by SJSN.
A. Policy Background
The Indonesian State has provided social insurance-including
health insurance, old age insurance, and pensions-to civil servants, the
police force, and members of the armed forces for several decades.' 51
Since 1992, similarly modeled social insurance has also been available
for private sector workers, but only those who work within the formal
economy. 152 These insurance programs are contribution based and have
been managed by purpose-built state-owned enterprises, some of which
have a favorable reputation and some of which have a reputation for
unreliability. 15 3 Indonesians who work within the informal economy-an

148. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2004 Tentang Sistem
Jaminan Sosial Nasional (Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 Year 2004 About
the National Social Security System) (Indon.) [hereinafter SJSN].
149. SJSN, art. 18.
150. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 24 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan
Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 24 Year 2011
About The Social Security Administrator) (Indon.).
151. For a brief discussion of social insurance measures, see Muliadi Widjaja & Robert
A. Simanjuntak, Social Protection in Indonesia: How Far Have We Reached?, in SOCIAL
PROTECTION IN EAST ASIA - CURRENT STATE AND CHALLENGES 157, 159 (M.G. Asher et al.
eds., 2010); Dinna Wisnu, Indonesia's Experience with Targeting Schemes, is it Heading

Towards Universal Coverage? Case of PNPM and PKH 3 (July 25, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
152. See Alex Arifianto, The New Indonesian Social Security Law: A Blessing or Curse
for Indonesians?, 23 ASEAN ECON. BULLETIN 57, 58-60 (2006); Widjaja & Simanjuntak,
supra note 151, at 172-74.

153. Widjaja & Simanjuntak, supranote 151, at 167-68, 175; Arifianto, supra note 152,
at 61.
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estimated 65 percent of Indonesian workers, including Indonesia's
54
poorest citizens-are not covered by social insurance.
Alongside social insurance for formal-economy workers, the
Indonesian government ran, and continues to run, social assistance
programs for the poor that provide cash or essentials such as food. 155 For
example, the Program Keluarga Harapan transfers cash to pregnant
women and mothers to access basic healthcare and education for
themselves and their children. 156 Another recent social assistance
program experiments with decentralization-the PNPM Mandiri
program, which grants funds to local governments and allows
15 7
community members to decide how to spend the money.
Thus, the poor in Indonesia receive social assistance from the state
but do not have social insurance like many of their more privileged
counterparts. SJSN made a bid to change that. This law stipulates five
benefits-health, pension, old-age savings, death benefits, and worker
accident insurance-for
all Indonesians. Universalizing social
insurance, as SJSN sought to do, was extraordinarily ambitious. It
required not just combining the existing social insurance programs but
also extending these safety nets on a scale that has no close precedent.
As the World Bank has noted, "[N]o other country with such a large
informal sector has implemented a national social insurance scheme
covering all workers.' 5 8
SJSN was formulated during the period of deep political reform that
followed the Asian financial crisis and Suharto's subsequent, dramatic
fall from power. Big transitions can embolden policy makers, 5 9 and
SJSN's ambition certainly seems like a direct result of Indonesia's

154. Int'l Monetary Fund, Indonesia:Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 15/75, at
23 (Mar. 2015), available at http://www.imf.orgtexternal/pubs/ftIscr/2015/cr1575.pdf. The
World Bank estimates the number of workers in the informal economy in Indonesia to be
one million. See World Bank, Implementation of BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, POLY NOTE ON
SJSN, May 2012, at 3, available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/eni2012/05/
16394353/implementation-social-security-administrative-bodies-bpjs-ketenagakerjaan.
The Informal Sector Survey by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics in 2009 indicated that
the percentage of people in non-agricultural informal sector was 72%. See Int'l Labour
Org. Dep't of Statistics, Statistical Update on Employment in the Informal Economy 4,
tbl.1 (June 2012), available at http:/Ilaborsta.ilo.orgapplv8/data/INFORMALECONOMY/
2012-06-Statistical%20update%20-%20v2.pdf.
155. Wisnu, supranote 151, at 41; Widjaja & Simanjuntak, supra note 151, at 159.
156. Wisnu, supranote 151, at 3-15.
157. Id.
158. Policy Note on SJSN: Implementation of BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, WORLD BANK
(May 1, 2012), http://documents.worldbank.orgtcurated/en/2012/05/16394353/implementationsocial-security-administrative-bodies-bpjs-ketenagakerjaan.
159. MERILEE S. GRINDLE & JOHN W. THOMAS, PUBLIC CHOICES AND POLICY CHANGE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 14 (1991).
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economic trauma and tumultuous democratization in the late 1990s. In
1998, Indonesia's economic output contracted by 14 percent-a sharper
fall than any country had experienced since the Great Depression of the
1930s. 160 Median daily wages fell by 30 percent in rural areas and 40
percent in urban areas, pushing hundreds of thousands of Indonesians
into poverty. 161 Wisnu notes that in the aftermath of the financial crisis,
influential voices advocated a systematic response to the rise in poverty
rather than an ad hoc temporary measure. 162 In 2002, the Indonesian
government created an internal task force to draft the law. This task
force had no representatives from trade unions or private-sector
employers, and critics point out that the law was drafted and passed in
haste, without adequate consultation or the necessary planning and
63
financial forecasting. 1
B. ConstitutionalFramework
When SJSN was drafted, the Indonesian government was
confronting both pressure and opportunity. President Megawati
Sukarnoputri's government needed to communicate that it was
committed to ordinary Indonesians (who could now vote and criticize the
state far more than was previously the case). In addition, the
Indonesian Constitution, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945164 ("the
constitution"), had been amended to include the right to social security
for individuals.
Article 28H of the Indonesian Constitution states that all
Indonesians have the right to social security, "in order to develop oneself
fully as a dignified human being."'165 Article 34(2) imposes an obligation
to provide social security on the state. It provides that "impoverished
persons and abandoned children shall be taken care of by the State" and
requires the state to "develop a system of social security for all of the
people" and, more expansively, to "empower the inadequate and
underprivileged . . . in accordance with human dignity." 166 Article 34
also obligates the state to "provide sufficient medical and public service
facilities."

160. BLUSTEIN, supra note 51, at 87.
161. Id.
162. Wisnu, supra note 151, at 2.
163. Arifanto, supranote 152, at 65.
164. Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 [CONSTITUTION]
1945, art: 28H (Indon.).
165. Id. art. 28H § 3.
166. Id. art. 34(2).
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These provisions were added to the Indonesian Constitution during
four crucial constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2003, which
transformed Indonesia's authoritarian political system into a
democracy. 167 The second amendment, added in 2000, inserted a
catalogue of human rights into the constitution, 168 including civil and
69
political rights as well as the economic and social rights to, inter alia,
172
171
170
a healthy environment,173
social security,
medical care,
shelter,
174
and improvement of one's welfare. Article 28(I)
an education,
obligates the state to protect, advance, and fulfill all these constitutional
rights. In addition, the constitution imposes express positive duties on
the state in relation to particular rights, including social security. As
noted in Section I, socioeconomic rights are now recognized in many
national constitutions, particularly those drafted during democratic
transitions in the 1990s. Even so, the Indonesian Constitution is
175
it
unusual in both the number and type of socioeconomic rights
recognizes, and in specifically imposing positive duties on the state.
The reformasi era resulted not just in constitutional rights, but also
an independent judiciary 176 and the establishment in 2003 of a
constitutional court that has the power to review legislation. 177 In early
judicial review decisions involving economic policy, the Constitutional
Court was surprisingly bold. Controversially, the Court struck down a
law privatizing the electricity sector in 2004 based on a rather vague
constitutional provision that requires the state to retain power over
"sectors of production which are important for the country and affect the
life of the people."'1 78 In a subsequent decision that engaged the same
provision, the Court upheld, but closely reviewed, a law regulating the

167. For an account of constitutional reform during these years, see Tim Lindsey,
Constitutional reform in Indonesia: Muddling Towards Democracy, in INDONESIA: LAw
AND SocIETY 23-42 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2d ed. 2008).
168. Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 [CONSTITUTION]
1945, ch. XA (Indon.) (amended 2000).
169. Id. art. 28C.
170. Id. art. 28H § 1.
171. Id.
172. Id. art. 28H § 3.
173. Id. art. 28H § 1.
174. Id. art. 28C § 1.
175. Jung et al. show that while about 70% of current constitutions contain at least one
expressly justiciable social and economic right (most typically the right to education), only
25% contain ten or more social and economic rights. See Jung et al., supra note 3, at 8.
176. Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 [CONSTITUTION]
1945, art. 24B (Indon.) (amended 2000).
177. Id. art. 24C § 1.
178. Phillippa Venning, Determinationof Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the
Indonesian Constitutional Court, 10 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 100, 114-18 (2008).
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water sector. 179 On the whole, the Constitutional Court has veered
between interpreting strongly worded socioeconomic rights quite
literally and being more deferential to the executive. For example, the
Court held that the constitutional duty to spend 20 percent of the state's
budget on education is immediately binding, rejecting the government's
argument to the contrary, yet it declined to invalidate provincial
budgets that failed to fulfill this ostensibly binding duty. 180 However,
even if the Constitutional Court's early literalism has been tempered,
there is no doubt that socioeconomic rights and duties in the Indonesian
constitution are justiciable, even when judicial review might affect
economic policy and public finances.
C. Preamble
The preambular "General Elucidation" to SJSN makes clear that
the law is tied to the constitutional right to social security and to the
constitutional duty to create a social security system. The General
Elucidation also references international standards, noting that the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights guarantees social security and
that the International Labor Organization Convention 102181 asks
182
states to provide a safety net for workers.
After situating the law within the state's human rights obligations,
the General Elucidation points out that existing policy has fallen short.
The General Elucidation notes that existing social security programs
"protect only a small portion of society. The majority of people have not
been adequately protected. In addition the administration of these
schemes has not been able to provide fair and adequate protection to
83
participants according to program benefits which are their rights."'
The General Elucidation also lays down principles to guide the
development of the social security system. 8 4 These include governance
principles such as the "principle of transparency, prudence,
accountability, efficiency and effectiveness" and financial principles
stating that investment yields will be reinvested in social security funds
and that funds themselves will be not-for-profit. 185 A few principles
179. Id. at 118-21.
180. Id. at 124-5.
181. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Minimum Standards of
Social Security, June 28, 1952, 35 I.L.C. No. 102.
182. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 40 Tahun 2004 Tentang Sistem
Jaminan Sosial Nasional (Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 40 Year 2004 About
the National Social Security System) General Elucidation (Indon.) [hereinafter SJSN].
183. Id.
184. Id. General Elucidation, art. 4.
185. Id. General Elucidation.
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emphasize the universality of the social security system-the principle
of portability clarifies that moving jobs or homes will not restrict access
to social security, 186 and the principle of compulsory participation states
that "participation is mandatory for all people" but with the caveat that
participation may be subject to "government economic affordability and
program feasibility." 18 7 The principle of mutual assistance acknowledges
the implications of compulsory participation for all Indonesians. It
emphasizes that the new social security system is intended to "improve
social justice for all Indonesian people," and therefore, "the able
participants are to assist the less able in the form of compulsory
membership for all people; the low risk participants are to assist the
188
high risk; and the healthy participants are to assist the sick."'
Thus, SJSN justifies what it is doing by reference to constitutional
and international human rights, as well as the state's past
inadequacies. Forward-looking principles emphasize social justice, even
when this might impose duties on the more privileged to assist those
who are less so. The law's (non-binding) rhetoric rests firmly in
Indonesia's post-reformasi constitutional order, referencing a state that
will be accountable to a community of rights-bearing individuals.
SJSN's binding provisions, discussed below, are somewhat more
ambiguous.
D. Ambit of the Law
All the different forms of social insurance introduced by SJSNhealth insurance, old-age savings, worker pensions, work-accident
insurance, and death benefits-share certain features. Participation is
compulsory, and each participant's contribution is a percentage of salary
or a fixed nominal amount.1 8 9 The government will pay contributions for
the "poor and underprivileged," who are deemed to be participants in
the social security system.190
SJSN details who is covered by each particular type of social
insurance. For example, each participant's health insurance can cover
five family members, including adopted children and stepchildren. 191
The average Indonesian household has 4.57 members, 192 so the five-

186. Id.
187. Id.
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Id. General Elucidation,
Id. art. 17.
Id. art. 1(5).
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person limit seems designed to be comprehensive. To be entitled to a
pension, individuals must contribute to the pension fund for fifteen
years. 193 If a working parent dies, surviving children receive the
parent's pension until they marry or turn twenty-three. 194 Dependent
parents are also entitled to "inherit" pension benefits if an unmarried,
working child dies, reflecting the Indonesian reality that many people
are financially dependent on their children. 195 In addition to factoring in
a worker's dependents, SJSN also incorporates a buffer for those who
lose their jobs-unemployed individuals can claim benefits for six
months after being laid off,' 96 at which point, if they are still
unemployed and qualify as "underprivileged," the government steps in
to pay their contributions. 197 Work accident insurance is also clearly
defined-it entitles beneficiaries to medical treatment and, if they die or
are permanently disabled, to a cash payment. 198
However, while SJSN delineates who is covered by different types of
social insurance, it leaves important decisions to the discretion of the
executive. The government decides, and can change, how much of a
burden social security places on individuals and employers in the
present and how much protection it may offer in the future.
Contribution rates are not laid down in the law; instead, the national
government sets these "based on social and economic development and
basic life necessities.' ' 99 SJSN provides minimal, very loose guidance on
making this crucial decision-for example, the government has to factor
in the risk of the work environment when deciding contribution rates for
work accident insurance. 20 0 For worker pensions, not only does SJSN
leave the contribution rates to the government, it does not specify
retirement age either. 20' Another fundamental decision left to the
executive is defining who qualifies as "underprivileged" and "poor" and
who is therefore entitled to have his or her social security contributions
covered by the government. Further, while SJSN legislates into
Income Generating Activities Project), available at http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/
templates/rigaldocs/Country-survey-informationl4_Indonesia93-Components of the_
Income-Aggregate.pdf.
193. SJSN art. 41(2).
194. Id. art. 41(1)(d).
195. Id. art. 41(1)(e). The age dependency ratio in Indonesia in 2010 was fifty-two--i.e.,
Indonesia had fifty-two dependents (people younger than fifteen or older than sixty four)
per 100 persons in the working-age population. See Age Dependency Ratio, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
196. SJSN art. 21(1).
197. Id. art. 21(2).
198. Id. art. 31(1).
199. Id. art. 17(3).
200. Id. art. 34(3).
201. Id. art. 39(4).
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existence a comprehensive "cradle to grave" social security system, it
does not specify when the state must create and implement this system.
Instead, SJSN allows programs to be rolled out progressively, first
covering the formal sector and then the informal sector, 202 and gives the
President of Indonesia the authority to set the pace for this graduated
20 3
implementation.
E. Entitlements and Obligations
Thus, SJSN lays down what types of social security the national
social security system will provide and whom each type of insurance will
cover. How much of a benefit and burden each type of insurance entails
is not specified, and neither is a timetable for setting up the social
security system. On this analysis, SJSN imposes obligations on the
Indonesian state but leaves the executive considerable leeway regarding
how and when to fulfill those obligations and considerable control over
defining the content of the obligations themselves. While the
constitutional right to social security underpins SJSN, the law does not
expressly recognize an overarching right to social security or
disaggregated rights to the five distinct types of social insurance.
Instead, it creates a few far narrower rights, which are discussed below.
SJSN grants participants in social security programs "the right to
obtain . . . information on the administration of the social security
programs in which he or she participates. ' 204 It further specifies that
participants are entitled to information about the accumulated corpus of
contributions, the rate of return on investments of their contribution,
and the benefits payable through different programs. 205 The government
is required to disclose this information "at least once a year." 206 The
BPJS law also includes providing information about social security
programs to "participants and [the] public" as one of the core tasks of
207
social security institutions.
SJSN also establishes a right to compensation. It provides that
participants in the health and work accident insurance programs are
entitled to compensation if their "region does not have adequate health

202. Id. art. 13(1).
203. Id. art. 13(2).
204. Id. art. 16.
205. Id. art. 49(3).
206. Id. art. 49(4).
207. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 24 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan
Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 24 Year 2011
About The Social Security Administrator) art. 10 (Indon.) [hereinafter BPJS].
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facilities to meet [their] medical needs." 208 However, the law does not set
rates of compensation or require that compensation be commensurate
with harm suffered as a result of deficient healthcare or sufficient to pay
for private medical treatment. Rates and norms would prove difficult to
define, since compensation under SJSN seems to arise in lieu of
inadequate healthcare rather than delayed or withheld health
insurance. SJSN's provisions on compensation imply a right to
reasonably reliable, accessible healthcare. In fact, health infrastructure
is highly variable in Indonesia and is undoubtedly below par in its more
remote regions. If these legal provisions were interpreted generously,
they could potentially lead to hundreds of thousands of claims for
compensation, which suggests that the government will not only set low
rates of compensation but also narrow down what health facilities are
"adequate" in this regard.
The dispute resolution mechanism established by the BPJS law
arguably creates an implicit right to a hearing. Institutions
administering social insurance are required to establish a complaints
resolution mechanism and must respond to any participant's complaint
within five days. 20 9 If the agency's response does not satisfy a
participant, the participant can take his or her grievance into
mediation. The BPJS law provides that the parties must mutually agree
in writing on the mediator, 210 which gives individuals somewhat more
control than simply being funneled into an administrative forum. Either
party can go to court if the dispute is not mediated to a resolution that
211
each accepts.
SJSN and the BPJS law together result in public law rights that
mirror private contractual rights. Individuals have many of the rights
they would have if they purchased private insurance. However,
Indonesian residents have no choice about whether to participate in
these programs; they must do so, as must private-sector employers. The
BPJS law provides that participants have a duty to disclose information
to national social security institutions; 212 employers have a duty to
register employees in the system 213 and collect and pay social security
contributions. 21 4 BPJS commissioners can punish employers who evade
these obligations with administrative sanctions, 21 5 ranging from a mild
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211.
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215.

SJSN arts. 23(3), 32(3).
BPJS art. 48(1)-(2).
Id. art. 49(2).
Id. art. 50.
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measure-such as a written warning-to fines to denial of "certain
public services"216-such as processing applications for business licenses
and building permits. 217 This last power, in particular, could prove an
important tool in securing compliance from businesses.
Furthermore, the most basic right that participants have under
each program-the right to, inter alia, health insurance or a pension per
se-is variable in scope because levels of contribution, service, and
returns are determined by the government of the day. A subsidiary
right such as the right to compensation is similarly variable because the
government sets rates of compensation 2lS and might set these at a level
that renders compensation entirely nominal. Thus, Indonesian residents
have social security rights of uncertain content accompanied by
nonnegotiable obligations to participate in social security programs and
make the required social security contributions.
F. CreatingInstitutions to Implement Social Insurance
Clearly, SJSN is best viewed as a "framework law" setting definite
endpoints-universal access to five types of social insurance-but not
specifying how to reach those ends. It is not entirely ambiguous and lays
down some surprisingly detailed rules (a five-day deadline for
responding to individual complaints, for example). But on the whole,
SJSN is a charter for future action, for progressive realization of the
right to social security, guided by the principles it articulates. The many
fundamental decisions still to be made are not ceded exclusively to the
executive branch, however-SJSN stipulates future legislation on
particular issues.
Adopting a framework law is a choice, but in this instance was also
a necessity. As mentioned above, when drafting the law, the government
did not properly calculate its fiscal consequences. Absent careful
forecasting, it would have been risky to decide contribution or benefit
rates, particularly for the defined benefit pensions included within
SJSN. Moreover, Indonesia's public health infrastructure would not, in
2004 or even today, be able to deliver the medical care envisioned by
SJSN.219 Even where infrastructure is robust, tracking beneficiaries
would be difficult. At the time, the government had yet to identify
people who could be categorized as poor and were therefore exempt from
216. Id. art. 17(2).
217. Id. Elucidation to art. 17(2).
218. SJSN art. 33.
219. See PANDU HARIMURTI ET AL., THE NUTS & BOLTS OF JAMKESMAS: INDONESIA'S
GOVERNMENT-FINANCED HEALTH COVERAGE PROGRAM 17-20 (World Bank Universal

Health Coverage Studies Series ed., 2013).
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making social security contributions. It also needed to identify and
enroll informal sector workers who were not poor, create systems to
ensure they were contributing regularly to social security funds, and set
contribution rates that provide a safety net but do not discourage
"formalization" of the economy. In a recent review, the World Bank
stressed the need to develop regulations on investment and risk
management and to guard against insolvency. 220 All these tasks raise
daunting questions of politics, logistics, design, and implementation.
SJSN was drafted and presented to the legislature by then
President Megawati Sukarnoputri's government. In 2004, soon after
SJSN was passed, Sukarnoputri, who leads the Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), lost her mandate and was replaced by
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the leader of the Partai Demokrat. The
"SBY" administration was not enthusiastic about tackling its
predecessor's flagship legislation, not least because SJSN's aims might
have seemed quixotic and certainly demanded the sort of marathon
effort that does not dovetail well with a five-year electoral cycle. Even
the preliminary task of estimating the fiscal implications of
22 1
universalizing social security was a complex one.
After SJSN was passed, there was a hiatus with little movement on
the law's aims. SJSN gave the state five years to set up social security
institutions and merge the state-owned enterprises administering
existing social security programs into the new structure. 222 The SBY
administration missed this 2009 deadline, and the same year, a group of
trade unions challenged the Indonesian government's failure to
implement the system created by SJSN in the Jakarta district court. As
this lawsuit made its way through the district court, PDIP members in
the Indonesian House of Representatives began working with trade
unions to draft a law giving content and institutional form to the social
security system created by SJSN.223 In 2011, the district court ruled in
the petitioners' favor, holding that the Indonesian government had to
make progress on fulfilling its obligations under SJSN.224 The court's
ruling was somewhat superfluous, as by this point the government had
introduced its own law to set up social security institutions. However,
campaigners for progress on SJSN's promises point out that the

220. See Policy Note on SJSN, supra note 158, at 3.
221. See interview with Dr. Suahasil Nazara, Professor, Univ. of Indon. Faculty of
Econ., in Jakarta, Indon. (Aug. 27, 2013).
222. SJSN arts. 5(1), 52(2).
223. See interview with Surya Tjandra, Lecturer, Atma Jaya Catholic Univ., Member,
Trade Union Rights Centre, in Jakarta, Indon. (Aug. 23, 2013).
224. See District Court of Central Jakarta Judgment No. 278/PDT.G/2010/PN.JKT.PST
(July 13, 2011) (unofficial translation on file with the author).
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combination of litigation and political organizing pressured the
225
incumbent government to draft its own law.
Thus, in 2011 the law concerning the Social Security Administrative
Body (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial or "the BPJS law") was
passed. 226 The BPJS law's preambular General Elucidation avoids the
high rhetoric of SJSN's preamble and notes straightforwardly that it is
being passed following SJSN's instructions to create social security
institutions. 227 The law creates two "social security administrative
bodies," one to administer health insurance and the other to administer
pensions and other forms of social insurance. 228 It does not attempt to
resolve any of the design and implementation dilemmas involved in
universalizing social security. Instead, the BPJS law concentrates on
who will implement these programs, how to choose senior
administrators, and how to keep them honest.
As the social security system expands, the BPJS institutions will
manage a lot of money. If ordinary Indonesians do not trust these
institutions, they will try to evade the contributions to social security
funds that are mandated by SJSN. Arifianto suggests that this might
happen, arguing that the SJSN system is not just fiscally unfeasible but
also that it neglects the best interests of individuals because it does not
allow competition in social security provision. 229 Exclusive state control
over social security funds does not inspire confidence, given Indonesia's
230
history of government graft, both mundane and spectacular.
Therefore, it is crucial that social security institutions are subject to
effective checks and balances. The Indonesian government guarantees
social security funds, so if mismanagement led to funds becoming
insolvent, the government would have to bear the resulting liability. As
the World Bank points out, the government has a strong incentive to
ensure that BPJS operations are clean, technically sound, and well
supervised. 231
1. Appointing the Right People and Holding Them Accountable
The BPJS law makes both the social security institutions it
establishes responsible to the President of Indonesia, 232 who is advised

225.
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by a council of social security experts. 233 Each institution is to be
managed by a board of directors and monitored by a board of
commissioners. Directors and commissioners face a reasonably public
selection process. The President of Indonesia forms a selection
committee with members from both the government and the private
sectors. 234 The selection committee must publicize its choice of
candidates and give the public at least five days to respond before
recommending candidates to the President. 235 The President appoints
directors from among these candidates, 236 while commissioners must be
further approved by the legislature. 237 The President also has wide
powers to remove commissioners and directors on grounds ranging from
incompetence, mismanagement, 238 and criminality 239 to the loose and
240
malleable ground of "behaving abominably."
Once directors and commissioners take office, the BPJS law is very
concerned with preventing conflicts of interest. Commissioners and
directors cannot be connected to government bodies, businesses, or
NGOs related to social security programs. 241 Reflecting Indonesia's
damaging experiences of nepotism under Suharto, the BPJS law
stipulates that commissioners and directors cannot have "family ties to
the third degree" with any of their counterparts. 242 There are also
injunctions against "decisions which contain elements of conflict of
interest" 243 and "committing disgraceful acts."244 However, while these
restraints seem expansive, contravening these rules attracts only
administrative sanctions from the President, which could include
dismissal but can entail as little as a written warning. 245 The BPJS law
takes financial misdemeanors more seriously. It is an offense,
punishable by a maximum of eight years in prison and a fine of IDR one
billion, to doctor official records, misuse social security funds, report
false information, transfer funds between different social security
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programs, or invest funds in financial instruments other than those
246
expressly approved by the government.
2. FinancialManagement of Social InsuranceFunds
More important than the rules to prevent corruption by senior
management are stringent norms on managing social security funds.
The BPJS law puts in place some important measures in this regard. It
specifies that the assets of social security funds-that primarily include
participant contributions and interest from investing this corpus of
money-must be scrupulously separated from other institutional
assets. 247 Social security fund assets can be used only for paying
248
benefits, administering programs, and investing.
Social security institutions are obligated to report annually to the
President 249 and to disclose their performance to the public through the
media. 250 Multiple public authorities, including the President's social
security advisors, the national Financial Services Authority, and the
State Financial Audit Board, can examine BPJS operations. 251 However,
the BPJS law does not build in periodic scrutiny by the legislature. Not
only is the legislature left out of routine scrutiny of social security
funds, it also has no role in authorizing special measures if these funds
are in trouble. The government can act alone to formulate "special
policies" to sustain social security programs if fiscal or monetary policy
necessitates this and take "special actions" to protect programs in a
financial crisis. 25 2 The lack of legislative scrutiny is surprising, given
that the Indonesian government's mismanagement and corruption
amplified the effects of the Asian financial crisis. However, while the
BPJS law exclusively empowers the Indonesian government to keep
social security programs viable in the face of financial strain, it does not
allow the government to dismantle social security institutions. The law
253
specifies that these institutions "shall only be dissolved by law."
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V. EVALUATING SOCIAL PROTECTION LAWS IN INDIA AND INDONESIA
In Section I of this article, I noted that social and economic rights
have proved difficult to enforce, and I argued that legislation could
provide the scaffolding that enhances enforceability. I pointed out that a
law can be used to define individual rights and state responsibilities, as
well as to create mechanisms to reduce corruption and improve service
delivery. I also suggested that legislating social and economic rights
could make these rights more accessible to individuals, legitimize
judicial enforcement, and embed these rights in the public sphere more
firmly than policy alone. Below, I reflect on the extent to which the
NFSA, SJSN, and the BPJS law achieve those aims.
A. Tilting Toward Generality
Public and commercial legislation in Indonesia is primarily in the
civil law tradition, while Indian laws are designed for a common law
legal system. We might expect legislation within the former mold to be
thicker with detail, since civil law judges have less room to develop
principles to fill statutory gaps and ambiguities than common law
judges.
When comparing the NFSA with the Indonesian SJSN and BPJS
laws, however, legal tradition does not correspond to the level of
specificity in these laws. SJSN, in particular, is very much a framework
law, which outlines the principles and design for social security
programs but leaves the details to further implementing legislation and
government regulations. The first such implementing legislation is the
BPJS law, which creates institutions and stipulates how office holders
will be appointed and regulated but does not engage with program
design. The Indian NFSA, while laying down entitlements and
obligations, also leaves much of the necessary detailing to state
governments within India's federal political system. For example, the
NFSA provides that social audits should be used to monitor the
performance of the food distribution system but does not specify how
often audits should take place.
The nature of what these laws are attempting makes it more
convenient to be sparse on the specifics, regardless of the larger
legislative tradition within which the law operates. An emphasis on
principles, institutional mechanisms, and goals allows governments to
adapt social protection laws to their capacities and might make these
laws more politically palatable. It might also make social protection
laws more flexible, so that the goals or baseline standards set by the law
can operate alongside new and old policies. In fact, as discussed in
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Sections III and IV, all these laws quite substantially retain existing
policies, expanding and adapting rather than discarding them.
B. Tentative Rights
1. Substantive Rights: Weak and Expansive or Strong and Minimal
If social protection laws veer toward abstraction and sparse detail,
how does this affect the rights that such laws claim to protect and
advance? Neither the NFSA nor Indonesia's social security legislation
dwell on the overarching constitutional rights they seek to protect.
SJSN and the BPJS law expressly reference the right to social security
in the Constitution in the general elucidation to each law. The NFSA
does not even mention the "right to food." All three laws focus on
narrower substantive and procedural entitlements. The NFSA lays
down what benefit individuals will receive, how much of that benefit
they will receive, and which individuals are eligible to receive benefits.
The substantive entitlement itself is a narrow one. Destitute Indians
are entitled to, and the state is obligated to provide, food grain, rather
than a nutritionally varied diet. SJSN lays down what types of social
security individuals will receive, but neither SJSN nor the BPJS law
defines contribution rates or other fundamental details.
The Indian NFSA is delivering a focused good to a slice of the
population and slightly more expansive benefits to pregnant women and
young children. It creates a strong, unambiguous right, but also one
that is extremely spare. If we consider that the Act defines the state's
minimum core obligations, it is adopting a minimal minimum and, by
extension, a far thinner conception of the right to food than
international norms point toward. The Act's limited vision might reflect
a prudent, pragmatic assessment of state capacity and political will in
the foreseeable future. At the same time, it could have incorporated
more ambitious goals to be realized over the medium and longer term,
but does not do so.
SJSN is creating a universal system of social security comprising
multiple forms of insurance. The greater scope and complexity of the
Indonesian project might explain why both SJSN and BPJS sidestep
questions of quantity or quality of social insurance. SJSN avoids
assigning immediately deliverable, minimum core duties to the state. It
very much conceptualizes social security as a right to be progressively
realized, thereby creating expansive but weak rights. In fact, SJSN
cannot properly be viewed as creating immediately justiciable
substantive rights. Rather, it creates the shell for future justiciability;
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further implementing laws and regulations are needed before social
security rights are definite enough for individuals to claim.
2. ProceduralRights: Limited Rights in Social Security and Food
All the laws examined in this article create procedural rights. The
NFSA and SJSN recognize the right to information about food and
social security measures, and they place disclosure obligations on
governments as well. India has a stand-alone law that strongly protects
the right to information, 254 but the NFSA particularizes this right in
relation to food for the poor.
Both SJSN and the NFSA create what might loosely be described as
rights related to a hearing, though neither squarely incorporates a right
to a fair hearing. The NFSA gives individuals the right to file a
grievance, while SJSN grants the right to file a complaint and receive a
prompt response. Both laws create alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. SJSN requires that parties mediate disputes before going
to court. The NFSA sets up a local, administrative complaints
mechanism and allows appeals from the local grievance official to a
quasi-judicial food commission in the state capital. SJSN and the BPJS
law create clearer complaints mechanisms, and therefore clearer
procedural rights, while the NFSA leaves the relationship between
administrative and judicial dispute resolution unresolved. It is unlikely
that food commissions, each of which will have a handful of
commissioners, will have the capacity to hear more than a few appeals.
Commissions might choose to concentrate primarily on complaints that
highlight systemic flaws, leaving many appeals unheard.
These statutory procedural rights can usefully be conceptualized as
rights in social security and food, as suggested by Odinkalu. 255 These
are rights that might make it easier or safer to access and use the
benefit at issue but do not shape the size or content of the benefit.
Courts are practiced at enforcing procedural rights of this sort, and they
could do so without wading too far into policy design and budgetary
considerations. Therefore, strong procedural rights should be
incorporated into social protection laws. All the laws examined here

254. The Right to Information Act, No. 22 of 2005 (India).
255. See generally Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Impact of Economic and Social Rights in
Nigeria. An Assessment of the Legal Framework for Implementing Education and Health
as Human Rights, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 183 (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds.,
2008) (discussing the implementation of the rights to education and health care in Nigeria
in the context of both domestic and international law).
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miss this opportunity and are neither as comprehensive nor as coherent
as they should have been in pinning down procedural entitlements.
3. Non-Discriminationand Positive Measures
Under international law, non-discrimination falls within a state's
immediately binding, minimum core obligations in relation to social and
economic rights. 25 6 However, the right to freedom from discrimination is
not protected in any of the laws analyzed in this article. Strictly
speaking, specific non-discrimination statutory provisions are not
necessary, given that Indians and Indonesians have a constitutional
right to equality, which would certainly cover public service delivery.
Nevertheless, particularizing the state's general obligation not to
discriminate would have been beneficial. After all, the specific
manifestation of a general right or obligation is not always obvious, not
least to poorer rights holders. The NFSA and SJSN clarify what the
right to information means in relation to food and social security
respectively. It would have been useful to similarly set out what nondiscrimination means when administering food and social security
entitlements in countries with diverse populations and diverse
geographic terrains. Further, just as judges are well placed to enforce
procedural fairness in relation to social and economic rights, they are
similarly well suited to adjudicate non-discrimination claims.
Harnessing this judicial expertise could have aided individuals from
disadvantaged groups in both countries, but SJSN and the NFSA fail to
do this.
While the NFSA does not place non-discrimination obligationsobligations to respect the right to equality-on public authorities, it does
stipulate positive measures for women and children. The Act's
provisions on women reflect a substantive understanding of gender
inequalities, as well as a willingness to distill the lessons of past policies
and political reform. Other vulnerable groups-for example, indigenous
tribal communities--do not receive special measures, but the NFSA
leaves state governments the option to provide greater protection for
disadvantaged groups. By contrast, while SJSN commits the
government to paying social security contributions for the poor, neither
of the Indonesian laws acknowledges identity-based structural
disadvantage in any way.

256. CESCR General Comment 20, supra note 112,
supranote 30, 1, 5.

7; CESCR General Comment 3,
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C. Weak Remedies
Legalizing social policy involves delineating individual rights and
state obligations. Following from this, legalization-and legislation in
particular-should also define the consequences of violating rights or
defaulting on duties. This could include, inter alia, specific performance,
monetary damages, and punitive measures. It might even include
requiring the state to act against third parties who are disrupting
access to social protection. A key aspect of legalization is that the
coercive powers of courts can be brought to bear when individuals are
denied social protection rights. However, both the Indian and the
Indonesian laws dull the coercive potential of courts. These laws lack
clear provisions on different types of remedies. They also delay access to
courts.
Under the NFSA, individuals are entitled to a cash allowance if they
do not receive grain, but this provision does not actually cover the
situation where an individual's entitlement-whether food or cash-inlieu-is withheld or unreasonably delayed. SJSN grants individuals a
right to compensation but fails to clarify when this right comes into
play, and whether individuals are entitled to compensation when they
receive poor healthcare or when they cannot access health insurance.
Both laws leave rates of compensation or cash-in-lieu to be decided by
the government.
None of these laws establishes punishments for officials who have
been remiss, despite a long experience of corrupt public services in both
countries. Compensation from the public purse is unlikely to shift the
incentives of individual grassroots officials who might be corrupt or
negligent, in the way that the prospect of individual punishment would.
While no repercussions are stipulated for government officials, social
security institutions have the power under SJSN to punish privatesector employers who do not fulfill their legal obligations. This punitive
power against third parties might assist an individual whose employer
is evading contributions on his behalf.
As far as specific performance is concerned, the NFSA allocates
relatively weak remedial powers to the administrative mechanisms it
sets up. At the local government level, the designated grievance officer
would be able to direct junior officials on what to do, but not officials
who outrank the grievance officer. Food commissions cannot issue
binding orders to state governments; they can only recommend what to
do in response to individual complaints as well as systemic problems.
The mediation mechanism set up by SJSN gives individuals more
control over defining binding outcomes, at least at a formal level; in
practice, a person who is underprivileged might hesitate to assert
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preferences when resolving a dispute against an employer or public
authority.
Once individuals have traversed alternative mechanisms, they can
approach the courts. While judicial power to compensate and punish is
limited, judges can order government officials to fulfill statutory duties.
Such orders-public, embarrassing, and carrying the potential for
judicial punishment if flouted-might prove to be an important
disciplining force.
D. Mechanisms to Aid Accountability
Given the levels of public-sector corruption in India and Indonesia,
empowering individuals to enforce their due is one of the crucial
functions socioeconomic rights legislation should play. However, the
burden of making governments fulfill social protection duties should not
be left only to individuals. Asymmetries of information, resources, and
power mean that individuals can rarely trigger systemic improvements.
Therefore, it is important that all the laws examined in this article also
incorporate other rules and mechanisms to hold governments
accountable.
As discussed in Section III, the NFSA requires social audits at the
local level. It also sets up a hybrid watchdog institution to hear
individual complaints and investigate government performance of its
own accord as well as advise governments on policy. State governments
finance food commissions, which compromises the independence of these
institutions. That said, food commissions incorporate elements of the
"weak-form" dialogic judicial review that is advocated by scholars like
Tushnet and Dixon for social and economic rights. 257 Food commissions
cannot issue binding orders, but they can persuade and embarrass
governments. They can investigate and publicize serious violations of
the right to food, moderate conversations between governments and civil
society, and communicate good practice. They operate alongside courts
and could even work in tandem with courts on occasion-for example,
by monitoring whether the government is complying with court orders.
In Indonesia, the BPJS law sets up two new entities responsible for
implementing the goals laid down in SJSN. These entities have
enormous responsibility and power, and therefore, it is not surprising
that the BPJS law devotes attention to how senior personnel will be
appointed and regulated. While neither law prescribes penalties for
grassroots official corruption, the BPJS law lays down consequences for
wrongdoing by the directors and commissioners of social security
257. See TUSHNET, supra note 21; Dixon, supra note 36.
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institutions. The existing provisions are important, given the financial
risk to which corruption could expose individual beneficiaries. They are
also necessary if the new social security institutions are to garner public
legitimacy, given the long half-life of Suharto-era nepotism. However,
these provisions could go further and be smarter. Rules to ensure sound
financial management needs to be much more detailed, and this
statutory gap should be filled by government regulation or a new law. In
another regrettable omission, the BPJS law builds legislative scrutiny
into appointing senior personnel but not into monitoring their
performance thereafter.
In both India and Indonesia, social protection laws can improve
public services compromised by entrenched corruption. Both judicial
scrutiny and the obligation to disclose information aid accountability.
All the laws examined here establish a number of other accountability
mechanisms as well. Thus, government performance will be monitored
by existing institutions-the Financial Services Authority in Indonesia,
for example-and by specialized bodies-such as the food commissions
under the NFSA or the President's expert advisory council under SJSN.
The NFSA's provisions are more innovative and more attentive to
grassroots accountability. However, accountability mechanisms that
rely primarily on administrative scrutiny are unlikely to be as robust as
those that incorporate regular scrutiny by the legislature as well as
judicial review. In this regard, the BPJS law establishes stronger
accountability measures than the Indian NFSA, but both laws could
have worked more with the grain of democratic political competition to
build stronger monitoring mechanisms.
E. BringingRights Within Reach
Both SJSN and the NFSA create alternatives to conventional courts
whose practical repercussions are difficult to gauge without conducting
socio-legal research once these mechanisms have bedded down over the
next few years. However, we can evaluate at this stage whether the
laws create a facilitative framework for enforcing rights. On the one
hand, mediation in Indonesia and administrative forums in India delay
access to courts. On the other hand, these alternative mechanisms,
because they are relatively close at hand, might motivate people to
complain when deprived of an entitlement. In India, it is certainly the
case that litigation tends to be lengthy, opaque, and distressing-the
more so for those who are poor, as legal aid is difficult to obtain. Even
though administrative remedies are weaker than judicial ones, it is
probable that more people will use a local administrative mechanism
than would opt to litigate.
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While not a first resort, courts remain a later resort under both the
NFSA and SJSN. Since these laws clearly authorize judicial
intervention, it is likely that courts will feel free to respond vigorously to
official wrongdoing and delay, particularly where procedural rights are
at issue. In India, individuals will also find it easier to articulate their
claims, since these will flow from the concrete, relatively modest terms
of the NFSA rather than from the abstract terms of constitutional
rights. This would also be the case in Indonesia once entitlements under
SJSN are anchored by specific details, whether through government
regulations or additional legislation.
Of course, small social protection claims will not yield the sort of
principles developed by some of the celebrated, controversial judicial
decisions on social and economic rights in jurisdictions like India and
South Africa. However, the experience of litigation based on
socioeconomic rights legislation in Brazil indicates that court decisions
in small claims cases can influence government behavior. 258 As a corpus
of judgments on particular issues develops, principles emerge
incrementally through repetition, influencing policy content and
implementation.
In Indonesia, given that the social security system is going to be
universal, it is highly likely that the middle classes will litigate more
than the poor. There is, therefore, the danger that any policy shifts that
accrue as a result might reflect middle-class interests to the neglect or
even the detriment of the poor. Particularly for those who are
marginalized, it is important to preserve the option of class action and
public interest litigation before the higher judiciary alongside individual
claims in lower courts.
It is fortunate that none of the laws discussed here reduce space for
such litigation. In the past, Indian courts have ordered governments to
follow through on pre-existing policies, and the Indonesian
Constitutional Court has ordered the executive branch to fulfill
constitutional obligations related to social and economic rights. Judges
in both jurisdictions can still function as enforcement mechanisms, but
they will be on firmer ground since they are enforcing legislation-a
higher commitment than policy and a more detailed one than a
constitutional provision on its own. If state governments in India are
falling short of the NFSA's requirements, the Indian Supreme Court can
still use remedies such as "continuing mandamus"-periodic hearings
where governments report on progress. In both jurisdictions, public
258. See Florian F. Hoffmann & Fernando R. N. M. Bentes, Accountability for Social
and Economic Rights in Brazil, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 100, 136-38 (Varun Gauri &
Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008).
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interest litigation can still provide a platform for civil society groups and
governments to argue as well as negotiate with one another. Since SJSN
is a framework law, the results of judicial review could iteratively be fed
into future government regulations. Thus, despite several weaknesses,
these social protection laws can assuage fears about judicial overreach
during rarefied, occasional "impact litigation," while also facilitating
more mundane justiciability.
F. Stabilizing Social and Economic Rights
As noted above, whether these laws fulfill their potential to ease
rights enforcement and to legitimize and structure judicial intervention
can properly be evaluated only after a few years. Similarly, it is difficult
to ascertain this early whether the NFSA is a stable vehicle for the right
to food in India. In Indonesia, however, it is evident that the SJSN, once
in force, has proved to be quite "sticky" and has given the right to social
security a firmer foothold than policy alone would have given.
SJSN may have been passed during a unique time in Indonesia's
history, but its presence shifted the terms of politics-as-usual in the
years that followed. Despite the SBY administration's ambivalence
about SJSN, the Indonesian government chose to simply neglect the law
rather than repeal or amend it. At the same time, the existence of a law
helped civil society groups to lobby the government and mount a legal
challenge. It was no small thing for the Jakarta district court to order
the Indonesian government to press forward with SJSN's lofty promises.
The court would not have been able to do so without a law that, firstly,
authorized judicial intervention and, secondly, gave the government a
deadline for establishing social security institutions. SJSN legitimized a
judicial role in protecting the right to social security, and served as a
means for civil society to nudge the government. This legislation may
not have been the only means to lobby the state, but it was a potent one.
Eventually, the BPJS law emerged from a process of bipartisan debate
and negotiation in the Indonesian legislature. Providing social security
for all Indonesians may progress by inches, but SJSN has made it hard
to abandon this difficult endeavor.
In India, the NFSA's fate is currently less certain. When the Indian
government proposed the NFSA, the left-leaning United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) coalition was in power. As mentioned in Section III, the
draft law divided civil society and was heavily criticized by many policy
experts. Despite this strong criticism, the Act eventually passed after a
six-hour debate in the lower house of the Indian Parliament and a tenhour debate in the upper house. While largely incorporating pre-existing
policies and infrastructure, the NFSA also included provisions to
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appease market-oriented critics, such as allowing governments to
substitute cash allowances for food-grain. Half a year later, when the
avowedly pro-market National Democratic Alliance (NDA) took power in
New Delhi, it declared the NFSA excessively expensive and initiated a
review of the Act. 259 The government has since proposed to reduce the
number of people entitled to food-grain under the NFSA in the short
260
term and to make more thoroughgoing changes in the longer term.
These proposals have a strong element of political point scoring. The
NDA prioritized reviewing the previous government's flagship law over
other compelling policy questions, and the proposed reforms contradict
the NDA's earlier arguments, while it formed the Parliamentary
opposition, that the law was not generous enough.261 Whatever the
merits of different policy positions, it is unlikely in this political context
that any future amendments will be drastic. The public nature of the
debate currently unfolding 262 and negotiation within Parliament will
make it politically difficult to revoke food entitlements for the poor,
although it is possible that the content of these entitlements might shift.
CONCLUSION

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights may have recognized
social and economic rights on the same terms as civil and political rights
in 1948, but states have been slow to convert these rights from moral
claims to enforceable legal entitlements. In fairness, doing so is not
easy. Neither broadly drafted constitutional provisions nor international
legal standards give much guidance on how to make the budgetary,
distributive, and design decisions involved in implementing

259. See Nitin Sethi, Reforming FCI or cutting back food security?, Bus. STANDARD (Jan.
29, 2015), http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/reforming-fci-or-cuttingback-food-security-115012901297_1.html.
260. See id.
261. See id.; Press Trust of India, Food Security Act: BJP Wanted to Oppose but Feared
Backlash, IBN LIVE (Jan. 22, 2015, 07:46 PM), http://ibnlive.in.comnews/food-securityact-bjp-wanted-to-oppose-but-feared-backlash524358-37-64.html.
262. For a positive view of the proposed reforms, see Ajay Chhibber, A New Menu,
INDIAN EXPRESS (Feb. 9, 2015, 12:14 AM), http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/
columns/a-new-menu-2/; for a skeptical view, see Shambhu Ghatak, Shanta Kumar
Committee Report: Is This Committee OverestimatingLeakages in Ration to Curb the Food
Security Act? INDIA TOGETHER (Feb. 13, 2015), http://indiatogether.org/shanta-kumarcommittee-report-on-pds-leakage-and-food-security-act-government; for the view of the
political party leading the Parliamentary opposition, see Press Trust of India, Congress
Flays BJP Government on Suggestion to Cut in Food Security Act Coverage, ECON. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2015, 06:53 PM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-01-24/news]
58408184_1_food-security-act-party-spokesman-randeep-surjewala-bjp.
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socioeconomic rights. 263 Nevertheless, many states have been forced to
grapple more fully with these rights over the past two decades.
Constitutional recognition led to judicial review based on social and
economic rights in some countries. More recently, a few states have
attempted to legislate enforceable social and economic rights. In
assessing India and Indonesia's efforts in this regard, it is worth
remembering that these states had relatively few templates to learn
from.
Even with that caveat, the Indian NFSA and Indonesian laws on
social security are quite disappointing. They are partial and tentative in
particularizing substantive rights and recognizing procedural ones. This
failing, while understandable when we contextualize each law, hollows
the strengths these laws have. That said, the accountability
mechanisms and remedies these laws establish, despite some
regrettable omissions, will push the state to improve its performance
and enable individuals to enforce their rights more easily.
For all their flaws, these laws exemplify and will further stimulate
the mutually reinforcing relationship between constitutionalizing,
and
economic
rights.
litigating,
and
legislating
social
Constitutionalization of social and economic rights fostered judicial
review in both India and Indonesia. In India, the evident limits of
judicial review triggered demands for legislation to protect these rights;
in Indonesia, a new constitutional order inspired the state to proffer
such legislation. The resulting laws, in turn, enmesh the judiciary more
thoroughly in enforcing social and economic rights. These developments
may be slow and sometimes acrimonious, but they pressure the state to
do better, to treat progressive realization of social and economic rights
as a commitment rather than as a euphemism for inaction.
In Section I, I noted the observation by Sen and Dr6ze that
democratic governments since the twentieth century have averted
famines because they fear the retribution that would follow if they
ignored large numbers of their citizens in acute distress. However, as
those authors argue, this is only a small part of the historical picture.
While democratic governments in developing countries respond quickly
to extreme, headline-grabbing events, they have been far less effective
at eradicating chronic deprivation. The latter endeavor requires the sort

263. On the limits of international legal norms, see generally Christine Chinkin, Health
and Human Rights, 120 PUB. HEALTH 52 (2006) (arguing that human rights provide both
an alternative and a complementary language for discussing health care issues). On the
limits of socio-economic rights in general in this regard, see generally Varun Gauri, Social
Rights and Economics: Claims to Health Care and Eduction in Developing Countries
(Policy Research Working Paper 3006, 2003) (analyzing contemporary rights-based and
economic approaches to health care and education in developing countries).
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of routine, steady service delivery and governance that electoral politics
does not adequately incentivize. In countries like India and Indonesia,
supplementing the traditional checks and balances of democracy with
more specialized, accessible mechanisms to monitor the state will help
provide much needed incentives. The ethical and economic case for
developing such mechanisms could not be stronger-poverty disfigures
and shortens the lives of millions in both countries. Legislation on social
and economic rights, which allows us to deploy legal tools and
technologies to address deprivation, is one such democracy-deepening
commitment device. As such, the laws discussed in this article are
political and legal experiments that should be welcomed despite their
weaknesses. There are important lessons to be learned from the future
trajectory, impact, and failings of India's NFSA and Indonesia's laws on
social security.

